Türkiye always uses the historical conditions to its advantage to realise its national interests. In this context, Turkish leaders often play on different fields. Erdogan is one of the most exquisite masters of geopolitical navigation.

Ankara is declaring a ‘Turkish axis’ strategy, raising the status of the Turkish state from a regional to a supra-regional (if not global) player with permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

In this paradigm, Turkish diplomacy is trying to implement two key geopolitical doctrines: neo-Ottomanism (in relation to the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans, i.e. the territories of the former Ottoman Empire) and neo-Pan-Turanism (in relation to the Turkic countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as the Turkic peoples of Iran, Russia and China).

At the same time, Türkiye retains the key role of a being a NATO member in the Middle East and the idea of European integration with the new advantageous status as an energy hub and transit along the East-West line (the concept of a ‘Turkish bridge’ between Europe and Asia).

Syria in Türkiye’s plans

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rise to power in Syria of pro-Turkish forces led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, favourable conditions for Türkiye’s Middle East policy have emerged. In fact, Türkiye has established a protectorate over Syria today, and pro-Turkish figures (including President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, Director of the General Intelligence Service Anas Khattab and others) have found themselves holding key posts in the transitional government.

President Erdogan has achieved the lifting of US and EU sanctions against Syria, is planning to modernise the Syrian army of up to 300,000 people under Turkish control, as well as to create Turkish military bases on Syrian territory, all of which will ensure Türkiye’s leading position in the region.

However, it was in Syria that relations between Türkiye and Israel sharply escalated to military tensions. A new chapter in the escalation of Turkish-Israeli contradictions began a month after the Hamas attack on Israel. From November 2023, Ankara, after waiting for a pause, took a pro-Palestinian position in the armed conflict in the Gaza Strip and began publicly and sharply criticising Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. After the outbreak of the Third Lebanon War in the autumn of 2024, Türkiye expressed concern about the possible territorial threat to Anatolia itself. Erdogan then admitted that in the future, Israel’s aggressive aspirations may also concern Türkiye.

Erdogan stated: “I speak openly: after Palestine and Lebanon, the lands of our homeland will become a place that the Israeli administration will turn its eyes to”.

It seems Ankara’s plans to eliminate the Kurdish threat in north-eastern Syria and overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus made clear to the Turkish leader that a conflict of interests with other Middle Eastern actors (particularly with a strengthening Israel and a weakening Iran) is inevitable. Accordingly, the subsequent balance of power in the region depends on the United States, Israel’s main ally and Iran’s main opponent.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Iran and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah in Syria greatly weakened, and Tehran had to evacuate IRGC units from Syria. This situation, combined with the reduction of Iran’s capabilities in Lebanon, which borders Israel, naturally meets the interests of Tel Aviv. However, in Syria, Israel decided to increase its military successes and actually occupied its southern part, the so-called ‘security zone’ of the Golan Heights.

Israel is in no hurry to recognise the legitimacy of the pro-Turkish regime of yesterday’s radical Sunni organisation Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS is recognised as an international terrorist organisation in the Russian Federation), and continues to launch targeted attacks on military infrastructure and communications in Syria under the guise of ensuring national security in order to weaken Damascus’ military capabilities.

Türkiye’s intentions to establish military bases in Syria (especially in terms of air defence systems) are perceived highly negatively by the Netanyahu government, which has become the subject of a new escalation of Turkish-Israeli relations. Tel Aviv sees this as an attempt by Ankara to establish control over the airspace of the region and Israel in particular.

Given the preponderance of the Air Force in favour of the Israel Defence Forces, Tel Aviv periodically uses its advantage in the air to attack ground targets in Syria. In addition, Israeli intelligence, having experience in effective cooperation with Kurdish militant and political organisations in Iraq against Iran, is considering the Kurdish forces in Rojava in north-eastern Syria a likely proxy force against Türkiye. In southern Syria, the Mossad and the IDF are already using the issue of national minorities (particularly the Druze community) to justify their occupation policy in the security zone of the Golan Heights.

With the Donald Trump administration having come to power in the United States, Tel Aviv initially pinned great hopes on Washington’s help in advancing its interests vis-à-vis Iran and Syria. However, Netanyahu’s second visit to the United States in April did not satisfy Israel’s ambitions for a forceful solution to the Iranian nuclear file and Syria.

Washington has so far relied on negotiations and reaching compromises. At the same time, President Trump’s Middle East visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, with contracts totalling $3.2 trillion having been signed, as well as the US leader’s statement on lifting all sanctions against Syria at the request of Erdogan and Mohammed bin Salman, somewhat dimmed Tel Aviv’s hopes.

Several rounds of negotiations between representatives of Israel and Türkiye took place in Baku, mediated by President Aliyev. The main topic of the consultations was the Syrian issue. According to Azerbaijani media, the sides discussed reducing the risks of direct military confrontation and reaching a compromise on the deployment of Turkish military bases.

There is information that the Israeli side continues to object strongly to the creation of a Turkish air defence base, as it will pose a threat to the security interests of the Jewish state. Tel Aviv may agree to the formation of bases for Turkish ground forces in Syria. There is no final Turkish decision on this issue. Apparently, Erdogan is pinning his hopes on a trip to Washington and talks with Trump.

Israel did not particularly object to the appearance of Russian military (air and sea) bases in Syria under the regime of Bashar al-Assad, since Russia did not create direct threats to the interests of the Jewish state. However, Türkiye expects to replace the Russian bases with its own. The Turkish newspaper Türkiye reports in this regard that Ankara plans to establish military bases in Syria as part of the fight against terrorism. In particular, a joint base of the ground forces and the air force, as well as a naval base.

What is the essence of Erdogan’s risky policy?

On the morning of May 20, local militants attacked the Russian military base in Hmeimim (Syria). The shooting led to the attack being repelled promptly and the violators liquidated. However, the Russian side also suffered losses in servicemen.

Since 2015, Hmeimim has been the main Russian military air base in Syria (in 2017, an agreement was signed for its 49-year term), where the aviation strike group of the Russian Aerospace Forces is based. Accordingly, this facility is a fairly protected area and the sortie of a small group of militants could not reach any serious military objectives.

The question arises, who allowed such a provocation and why? Ankara is interested in replacing Russian military bases with Turkish ones. Given how close Turkish-Syrian relations are, Damascus will easily agree to such a development and the Turkish military presence in Syria. In this regard, it cannot be ruled out that the above-mentioned provocation against the Russian base in Hmeimim was known by the special services of Türkiye and Syria, which is an extremely unfriendly step towards Russia.

Türkiye continues to be an active supporter of the Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul. One of the main issues of the meeting of the President of the Russian Federation Putin and Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan in Moscow on May 27 was Ukraine. Naturally, Istanbul, as a place of negotiations on such an important international issue of peace between Russia and Ukraine, increases Türkiye’s political capital.

Erdogan’s desire to make Türkiye the place to end the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and achieve peace is clearly very high and promises the Turkish leader almost a Nobel Prize (they said Trump failed, but Erdogan can do anything and everything). At the same time, Türkiye’s growing role as a mediator and venue for negotiations allows Erdogan to circumvent Western sanctions against Russia in a certain sense, and receive economic and financial dividends.

In terms of pressure to reach compromises, the Turkish leader does not rule out the use of military bases in Syria, the supply of weapons and the possible deployment of so-called peacekeeping forces in Ukraine, as well as new breakthrough projects (for example, in energy, transport and communications) in the southern post-Soviet space (including a new escalation of military tensions in the south of Armenia to oust the 102nd Russian base in Gyumri from the region).

Such risky moves by the ‘Turkish grandmaster’ may be dangerous for Türkiye itself.

Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/06/04/Erdogan-is-implementing-a-risky-policy/