Türkiye is active in international affairs and offers its mediation in a number of conflicts, however in the resolution of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, Türkiye supports Baku.

Türkiye is forcing Armenia to accept Azerbaijan’s conditions

Relations between Türkiye and Armenia remain burdened by the historical legacy of the Armenian Genocide of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Türkiye is Azerbaijan’s main strategic ally and has taken on a firm pro-Azerbaijani position in the settlement of the Karabakh issue, which led to a forceful solution to the matter in favour of Baku.

However, for Türkiye, Azerbaijan’s restoration of full control over Nagorno-Karabakh is not the ultimate goal; Ankara’s geopolitical ambitions are much broader and extend not only to the South Caucasus, but also Central Asia. In this context, according to Ankara’s plans, Armenia, which lost Karabakh, should become Türkiye’s link with mainland Azerbaijan, and the victorious Azerbaijan should become a centre for integration with the Turkic countries of Central Asia.

Accordingly, a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Turkish terms ensures systemic geopolitical and geo-economic transformations in Eurasia from Istanbul to Samarkand. At the same time, Türkiye, as a NATO member, is counting on the support of the United Kingdom and United States as a kind of victory for NATO in the post-Soviet space. Türkiye also claims to be the leader of the Turkic axis within the framework of a multipolar world.

A peculiarity of Türkiye’s modern expansion into the South Caucasus and Central Asia is that it is not a direct military confrontation with geopolitical rivals (namely Russia, China and Iran), but an indirect diplomatic confrontation in the context of partnership strategies with Moscow, Beijing and Tehran. Ankara has been quite successful in using trade relations and the temporary difficulties faced by Russia and Iran to promote its own influence in regions of common interest.

Under Nikol Pashinyan’s government, Armenia, finding itself in a difficult geopolitical situation and de facto isolation without hopes for external military assistance, is becoming the object of further pressure from the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. If earlier Yerevan was categorically opposed to the opening of the Zangezur corridor to connect Türkiye with Azerbaijan and Central Asia, then after Pashinyan’s Istanbul visit in June this year, the Armenian side is “demonstrating some flexibility”, according to Erdogan.

In other words, Pashinyan proposes to replace the term ‘Zangezur Corridor’ with ‘Crossroads of the World’ and open the gateway for Türkiye to the rest of the Turkic world while formally preserving Armenian sovereignty over the southern region of Syunik (Zangezur). At the same time, Yerevan opposes extraterritoriality in the context of control over this transit route by the Russian FSB border troops, but does not deny the option of outsourcing to the United States (that is, transferring the Zangezur segment of the road under the supervision of an American company).

In such a scenario, the US, UK and Türkiye may alter the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus, which will isolate Iran from the north and Russia from the south. In this case, the Anglo-Saxons and Turks are unlikely to agree to the Russian North-South Transport Corridor project, which provides for Russian access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean via Iran. Accordingly, a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan without the participation of Russia and on a platform controlled by Türkiye or the United States could lead to new complications for Yerevan and Baku.

Internal political changes in the South Caucasus may define the new balance of power in the region

The Georgian example of modern domestic political transformations is very indicative of the logic of regional stability and security. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, the ruling Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia party has chosen the optimal position of non-interference and excluding another conflict with Russia.

Armenia, where society in the post-Karabakh period continues to be in a state of collective frustration, is conducting a rather contradictory foreign policy. The rating of Nikol Pashinyan’s government is rapidly plummeting. It is pursuing a conciliatory policy under the ‘era of peace’ formula, but in reality it devalues national interests and could well turn into a colonial appendage of Türkiye. In such a case, Baku acts as an instrument of Ankara’s political influence over Yerevan.

Azerbaijan, where the ruling elite is in a state of vertigo from the success in Karabakh, unjustifiably assumes the status of a regional leader and hopes to dictate the conditions for the development and security of the South Caucasus. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan counts on external allies and partners in Türkiye, the UK, Israel and the US. However, overestimating their own capabilities and underestimating their large neighbours (Russia and Iran) can hinder Baku’s long-term plans.

In Armenia, the current government, which is losing the support of the majority, uses administrative resources and law enforcement agencies to put pressure on the political opposition and persecute undesirable forces operating in the country. By signing a peace with Azerbaijan before the 2026 elections, Nikol Pashinyan may cause a surge of public indignation. A one-year postponement does not guarantee Türkiye a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan on its own terms.

Perhaps the parties agreed on the signing of a peace treaty in the United States or Türkiye during the meeting between Pashinyan and Aliyev in Abu Dhabi on July 10 this year. Pashinyan will obviously accept the full range of Baku’s preconditions (the rejection of the OSCE Minsk Group mechanism on the Karabakh settlement, the opening of the Zangezur Corridor with the participation of the United States, amendments to the Armenian constitution, the return of some Azerbaijani refugees to Armenia).

In Azerbaijan itself, there are no internal or external opportunities to influence the change of the ruling regime. A crisis of power here is only possible in the context of regional destabilisation and the military failure of President Ilham Aliyev. Baku’s maximalist approach could minimise its successes in Karabakh. Indeed, the only international legal document that determined the fate of Karabakh was the 1813 Treaty of Gulistan between Russia and Persia.

Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/07/13/turkiye-as-an-arbiter-in-the-armenian-azerbaijani-dialogue/