One of the most remarkable innovations of the latest US National Security Strategy (NSS), as compared to the previous documents of the kind, is that Taiwan was included in the list of key priorities.

Preliminary Remarks

The Taiwan issue clearly beckons already from the opening lines of the paragraph devoted to the deterrence of military threats.

From the author’s standpoint, both this emphasis and the overall framing largely correspond to emerging realities, which favourably sets this document apart from all its predecessors. Primarily due to a radical shift in its conceptual foundation from ideology to pragmatism. The sources of specific “ideologisation” of global problems, particularly those related to climate change, migration flows, and the suppression of opposition forces, are identified quite explicitly by the strategy. These sources are said to be the current supranational structures of Europe, as well as certain national “elites.” And it should be mentioned, utterly hostile to the interests of the countries and peoples of the continent.

This tendency is one of the substantial preconditions for the shift of the focus of US foreign policy interests from the Euro-Atlantic area to Latin America (the “Western Hemisphere”) and to the Indo-Pacific region with China as the key source of challenges. For this reason, the importance of the regional Quad configuration, comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, is particularly highlighted.

At the same time, Washington would prefer not to push its relations with Beijing towards direct military confrontation, instead concentrating its claims and demands primarily on the trade and economic sphere. The Taiwan problem, in fact, turns out to be the principal challenge to the long-standing “tightrope-walking strategy” that has for many years characterized US policy towards China and is merely indicated as such in the document at issue.

Strategic Ambiguity as the Core Principle of the US Approach to the Taiwan Issue

It should once again be outlined that the US strategy regarding Taiwan (the NSS has not altered it to any tangible extent) was formed back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the realities of the Cold War required the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing, which did actually occur on January 1, 1979. Simultaneously, Washington had to sacrifice diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which, however, was not “left to fend for itself.”

Three months later, Congress adopted a document known as the Taiwan Relations Act, legally binding for the US executive branch. Among other provisions, the TRA of 1979 articulated the “hope that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means and with the consent of the people living on both sides” of the Taiwan Strait.

Since then, Washington’s political practice, based on this document in general and on the cited provision in particular, as well as on a number of subsidiary acts in the form of the so-called “Reagan assurances,” has represented the main obstacle to Beijing’s establishment of administrative control over the island. The 2025 US National Security Strategy expresses a “commitment to our long-standing policy regarding Taiwan, which does not accept unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.”

At the same time, the document contains no hints at a possible abandonment of recognition of the “One China” principle, which was Beijing’s condition for the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations. In other words, Washington continues to adhere to the same policy of “ambiguity” regarding the Taiwan issue and does not move toward a “strategy of clarity” by establishing fully fledged interstate relations with Taipei, which was insisted upon by “hawks” (for example, John Bolton) in the US administration during Donald Trump’s first presidency.

And why should Washington actually resort to it if it is possible to avert Beijing’s bids to get rid of the key “pain in China’s foreign policy neck” even without excessive provocations towards Beijing? Nevertheless, it remains a risky balancing act in Washington’s relations with the principal geopolitical adversary.

Regional Reactions and Assessments of the New US NSS

The first and main conclusion that comes to mind upon examining the paragraphs of the NSS-2025 pertaining to the Taiwan issue is that frequent assumptions about the possible use of the island’s fate as a bargaining chip in Washington’s geopolitical negotiations with its main opponent are unfounded. In fact, such a prospect was disproved and debunked by Secretary of State Marco Rubio during a press conference held back in late October. Although it should not be ruled out that the US president per se may have something like this in mind.

However, no less and perhaps even more than during Donald Trump’s first presidency, the current administration demonstrates a significant presence of supporters of a hardline course towards China in general. Whereas previously this stance was represented, in addition to the aforementioned John Bolton, by the State Department under Mike Pompeo, today it is largely professed by the Department of Defense. The US Congress, moreover, on a bipartisan basis, proceeds with its consistently rigid positions towards China.

It is precisely to the joint efforts of Congress and the Department of Defense that the United States owes its recent measures to strengthen support for Taiwan. First, this includes Donald Trump’s approval of an amendment to a 2020 legislative act, which now obliges the State Department to “review the guidelines” of the US–Taiwan relationship on a regular basis, specifically, at least once every five years.

The second development, which is no less worth paying attention to, was the bill on US defense spending for the next fiscal year of $1 billion for comprehensive support for Taiwan also being included in the draft (apart from the regular deliveries of various types of US weapons, paid for by the relatively affluent Taiwanese themselves).

Such measures by Washington in the realms of the Taiwan problem fully correspond to NSS-2025. In turn, they were embraced with complete understanding and gratitude by Taiwan’s official authorities. Naturally, in the PRC, the document was evaluated in a directly opposite manner.

Finally, Japan’s growing involvement in the Taiwan issue is now gaining new evidence. At the same time, the nature of this involvement is becoming a serious source of tension in Tokyo’s relations with Beijing. A dangerous incident occurred in early December during exercises conducted by a group of PLA Navy ships led by the aircraft carrier Liaoning in an area east of Okinawa. Japanese F-15 fighter jets that appeared to monitor the exercises were, according to reports, twice illuminated by the onboard radar of a Chinese J-15 fighter, which prompted a series of harsh mutual accusations of provoking an armed conflict.

Meanwhile, it seems beyond doubt that these exercises per se were a reaction to a remark made a month earlier by Japanese Prime Minister S. Takaichi concerning the possible involvement of Japan in a hypothetical scenario of a military resolution by Beijing of the Taiwan issue. It should also be noted that the United States expressed support for Japan in this incident, albeit in a restrained and indirect form.

Finally, it must be stated with regret that the part of the new US National Security Strategy discussed above, which pertains to the Taiwan issue, is unlikely to serve as a barrier to the emergence of similar or even more dangerous incidents. The “ambiguity” surrounding the current state and future prospects of resolving the problem may prove to be one of the main obstacles to the realisation of the appealing idea of forming an Asia-Pacific “Big Five” as an alternative to the G7. An idea, attributed to Donald Trump, on a related note.

Vladimir Terekhov, Expert on Asia-Pacific Affairs. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/12/18/the-new-us-national-security-strategy-and-the-taiwan-issue/