For years, Saudi Arabia and the UAE appeared as twin pillars of a new Arab order - coordinating in Yemen, aligning against Islamists, and projecting confidence from the Gulf to the Horn of Africa. Today, that façade is cracking.

From the battlefields of Yemen to the ports of Sudan and Somalia, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are no longer simply partners. They are competitors. Beneath policy disputes lies a deeper struggle: Saudi Arabia’s determination to reclaim its primacy in the Gulf and to displace the UAE, especially Dubai and Abu Dhabi, as the region’s indispensable economic and political hub.

Where the Rift is Visible

The most visible rupture emerged in Yemen in late 2025, when Saudi military pressure reportedly compelled Emirati forces to withdraw from key positions. Both states had entered the conflict in 2015 as part of a Saudi-led coalition against the Houthi movement. Yet by 2019, the UAE had significantly scaled back its formal military presence, even as it strengthened ties with southern separatists grouped under the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The STC’s ambitions frequently clashed with forces aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which remained backed by Riyadh.

The divergence was not merely tactical. Abu Dhabi’s strategy centered on securing influence over strategic ports such as Aden and consolidating its footprint along Yemen’s southern coastline - moves consistent with its broader maritime doctrine. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, remained formally committed to preserving Yemen’s territorial unity under a central authority it could shape and influence.

Tensions escalated when the STC recently extended its control into the Hadhramaut and Mahra governorates. For Riyadh, the move threatened to entrench fragmentation and undermine its preferred political settlement. The Saudi response forced an Emirati pullback, marking a dramatic shift in what had once been portrayed as seamless coordination. Yet Yemen is only one arena in a widening contest.

In Sudan, the rivalry is more nuanced but no less consequential. Following the 2019 ouster of Omar al-Bashir, both Gulf states pledged billions of dollars in aid to Sudan’s military leadership. Initially, their support appeared aligned. Over time, however, differences emerged over the management of Sudan’s political transition and, more recently, over the civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as a diplomatic broker, hosting ceasefire negotiations in Jeddah and presenting itself as a stabilizing force. The UAE, meanwhile, has faced accusations of supporting the RSF - allegations it has consistently denied. Whether or not the claims are substantiated, the perception of divergent backing has transformed Sudan into another arena of parallel influence-building rather than coordinated strategy.

The contest extends across the Horn of Africa, where port access, maritime routes, and security alignments carry immense strategic weight. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 added another layer of complexity along the Red Sea corridor. The move has been widely interpreted as potentially facilitating an Israeli intelligence or military presence to monitor Houthi activity in Yemen. As reports indicate, Israel’s ties with Somalia were facilitated by the UAE, which has a longstanding commercial and security footprint in Berbera.

For Somalia’s federal government, the development struck at the heart of territorial sovereignty. Mogadishu fears that external recognition of Somaliland could embolden Ethiopian ambitions for Red Sea access via Berbera. Somali officials have accused Abu Dhabi of enabling this geopolitical shift. In response, they have sought Saudi backing and severed diplomatic ties with the UAE, further embedding Gulf rivalries into the political landscape of the Horn.

The Deeper Cause: Riyadh’s Bid to Reclaim Primacy

At the heart of this rivalry lies a structural shift inside the Gulf itself. For decades, Saudi Arabia was the undisputed political heavyweight of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). But over the past fifteen years, the UAE, particularly Dubai as a financial and logistics hub and Abu Dhabi as a strategic investor, has punched above its weight. The UAE’s assertive foreign policy has allowed it to position itself as a nimble middle power, projecting influence from Libya to the Horn of Africa.

Saudi Arabia’s transformation under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has altered that equation. Vision 2030 aims to diversify the Saudi economy and make Riyadh a global business capital. In 2021, the Saudi government announced that foreign firms would need regional headquarters in the kingdom to secure state contracts - a move widely interpreted as targeting Dubai’s long-held status as the Gulf’s commercial hub.

Energy policy has also exposed tensions. Disagreements within OPEC+ over production baselines in 2021 revealed friction between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over market share and long-term oil strategy. Though resolved diplomatically, the episode underscored diverging economic calculations.

In short, Saudi Arabia is no longer content to lead by default. It seeks to centralize capital, logistics, and political gravity in Riyadh. The UAE, having spent years building itself into a globalized entrepôt, is unlikely to cede that ground quietly. What appears as foreign policy divergence in Yemen or Sudan is, at a deeper level, an extension of a Gulf-wide recalibration of hierarchy.

Consequences of Rivalry

First, it fragments conflict mediation. In Sudan and Yemen, parallel patronage networks complicate ceasefire efforts. When regional powers back different factions - even implicitly - they reduce incentives for compromise. Second, it intensifies competition along the Red Sea corridor. Both states have invested heavily in ports, logistics hubs, and security arrangements from Jeddah to Berbera. As past reports indicate, Red Sea geopolitics is becoming increasingly crowded, with Gulf states treating the Horn of Africa as an extension of their strategic backyard.

Third, rivalry reshapes intra-GCC dynamics. The UAE’s model - liberal business environment, global connectivity, strategic assertiveness - once complemented Saudi weight. Now, as Riyadh liberalizes socially and competes economically, the complementarity is fading. Smaller regional actors, from Egypt to Ethiopia, may increasingly hedge, seeking investments from both but aligning fully with neither. The risk is not open conflict between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Rather, it is a persistent, low-grade competition that multiplies proxy alignments and hardens regional fault lines.

In the end, the Saudi-UAE rivalry is less about ideology than about primacy. It is a contest over who sets the economic rules of the Gulf, who anchors the Red Sea order, and who speaks for the Arab world’s new pragmatism. If Riyadh and Abu Dhabi fail to manage their rivalry, the struggle for Gulf supremacy may reverberate far beyond their borders to reshape, more broadly, alliances, redrawing economic maps, and determining whether the Red Sea becomes a corridor of integration or another theatre of fragmentation.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affair. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/03/06/desert-duel-saudi-arabia-and-the-uaes-struggle-for-gulf-supremacy/