The sharp deterioration of the situation in the Indo-Pacific once again challenges the role of leading international actors, among which China holds a key place.

Reaction to aggression against Iran and the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict

Both armed conflicts directly affect the interests of China. Moreover, there is a well-founded opinion that their instigation is aimed, first and foremost, at undermining the positions of the USA’s main geopolitical opponent in the Greater Middle East and South Asia subregion.

This is particularly relevant to the Iranian conflict. Iran is one of the few countries in the Middle East with which Beijing has been actively developing relations in recent years. Washington’s goal of regime change in Iran would, with high probability, lead to a radical change in the foreign policy course of the country, which is strategically important for China. It seems that Washington is not limiting the global confrontation with China to the Western Hemisphere as outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy. However, the pro-Israel lobby’s influence in the American establishment, whose interests are increasingly less correlated with the national priorities of the USA, is also evident.

Although the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict has “local” roots, it also objectively affects Chinese interests. Most importantly, several branches of the Chinese global Belt and Road Initiative pass through this South Asian subregion, the key one being the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The bombing of a Shi’a mosque in the Pakistani capital in early February could confirm the connection between the two conflicts, given that previously mosques have become targets of unrest in Shi’a Iran.

China’s reaction to these conflicts was predictable; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a sharp, negative statement regarding the aggression against Iran and called for an end to the Pakistan-Afghanistan armed incident.

Possibility of a US-China summit

It is clear that a hypothetically successful act of aggression against Iran would strengthen US President Donald Trump’s negotiating position at the meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping scheduled for early April. As of now, however, Beijing has avoided any specifics regarding the summit itself.

The initiators of the blitzkrieg against Iran likely believe that its successful completion would offset Trump’s weakening pressure on Beijing in the Taiwan issue, which is of utmost importance to China. After all, pursuing the administration’s hawkish line in this area would have made the already announced meeting with the Chinese leader impossible. Nevertheless, the current US administration probably views the summit itself more as an instrument of media and information influence ahead of the upcoming congressional elections.

Be that as it may, it is reported that Trump has initiated a slowdown in the continuous flow of American weapons to Taiwan. This is causing concern among the island’s leadership, which fears radical changes in Washington’s policy, namely sacrificing many years of de facto support for Taiwan’s independence in exchange for improved relations with China. However, such fears are hardly justified. They are directly contradicted, for example, by the blocking of China’s access to electronic products (that are not even that complex) even though the American manufacturing company had seemingly received permission to sell them. This “misunderstanding” fully corresponds to China being designated by the US as its main geopolitical opponent, as reflected in the 2025 National Security Strategy.

Ultimately, the delay in arms deliveries to Taiwan is a short-term tactical move. An attack on Iran and the blocking of China’s access to advanced technologies, on the other hand, are part of a fundamental strategy.

Chancellor Merz’s visit and European autonomy

China being assessed as the US’ main challenge to national interests is likely prompting Beijing to respond positively to attempts by European countries and Canada to enlist its support amid the escalating confrontation with the US administration. In this context, the visit of German Chancellor Merz to China at the end of February, accompanied by a large delegation of German business leaders, was particularly significant. This is unsurprising, given that $300 billion in annual bilateral trade is a key element of their relations and was at the centre of the negotiations.

The central event of Merz’s visit was his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. During it, the guest was presented with three fundamental principles for building bilateral relations. The first principle (which was apparently accepted) is as follows: mutual support between the two countries, which must be reliable partners. Xi Jinping views relations with Germany in the broader context of developing ties with Europe as a whole, urging it toward greater autonomy. The subtext of this is obvious.

The visit by the German chancellor is part of a wave of trips by European leaders to China following Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections in the fall of 2024. In Europe, alternatives to transatlantic positioning began to be sought, and the development of relations with the United States’ key opponent, i.e., modern China, was an expected option.

Current state of affairs with Japan

In recent years, Beijing has been paying increasing attention to relations with Japan, elevating them in importance to a level approaching the United States. However, Sino-Japanese relations, traditionally characterized by instability, have reached a critical point in recent months. The trigger was Prime Minister Takaichi’s harsh statements regarding the Taiwan issue.

In this connection, China viewed with apprehension the convincing victory of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the snap parliamentary elections on February 8. It significantly strengthened the positions of both Takaichi herself and the government she leads on the international stage.

Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, the son of former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, has been focusing on China. His actions, such as plans to deploy an air defense system on Yonaguni Island near Taiwan, are within his direct authority. Nevertheless, criticism of Beijing of restrictions on Japanese companies producing dual-use products indicates the 45-year-old Koizumi’s ambition to become prime minister in the future. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Takaichi’s own conciliatory rhetoric toward China has so far elicited no visible response.

Such is the positioning of China, one of the key players in the current stage of the Great Global Game, and it reflects important trends in its foreign policy.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the Asia-Pacific region. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/03/17/china-in-the-current-international-situation/