The positioning of Japan on the international stage is largely determined by the evolution of its relations with its key ally, the United States. The unpredictability of American foreign policy, which clearly manifested itself in the ‘impromptu’ in the Persian Gulf, has become a source of serious problems for Tokyo.

This term refers to Washington’s involvement in an anti-Iranian military operation that directly contradicts the core provisions of the latest edition of the United States National Security Strategy. At the same time, the document itself can be seen as a practical implementation of the concept of ‘offshore balancing’, formulated more than ten years ago, which significantly limited the scale of the country’s involvement in international conflicts.

The United States National Security Strategy for 2025 focuses on the ‘Western Hemisphere,’ which includes the Indo-Pacific region, and it fully aligns with Japan’s interests, because it is precisely here that its main tasks and challenges are concentrated. At the same time, the anti-Iranian operation formally falls beyond the realms of responsibility of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), the key US military command responsible for protecting interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

One of the important trends in Japan’s positioning in the region is the redistribution of responsibilities within its alliance with the United States, including through cooperation with INDOPACOM, in order to achieve a more balanced distribution. In this regard, the Japanese Ministry of Defence plans to establish shortly a special office that will be responsible for protecting national interests on the ‘Pacific flank.’ During a visit to Ioto Island (Iwo Jima), Defence Minister S. Koizumi, making reference to the increased activity of ‘neighbouring states’ in adjacent maritime areas, stressed the need to eliminate the ‘defence vacuum’ in the region.

Revision of basic defence documents

The plans to create a new office should be perceived in the context of a comprehensive revision of three key defence documents, which is to be completed by the end of this year. It is worth recalling that their latest revision was adopted in December 2022 and already contained ‘drastic’ innovations. The validity period of two of these documents is ten years, and that of the third is five years.

The fact that, halfway through the implementation period, the documents already require another, also ‘drastic,’ revision indicates Japan’s leadership evaluating the military-political situation in the Indo-Pacific region as rapidly changing. There are now new circumstances, unforeseen five years ago, that require urgent responses. Undoubtedly, these changes will be aimed at expanding Japan’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, seeking to strengthen its role in the military-political alliance with the United States.

Revision of Japan’s Constitution and new defence policy

For more than twenty years, in Japan, there has been an ongoing debate over the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, known as the ‘anti-war’ clause. It is important to note that even in its current form, it has not become a real obstacle to the gradual military-political ‘normalisation’ of the country, as experience has shown. The main reason for the delay in revising the article is the fear of inevitable foreign policy repercussions, especially in relations with China, which are already on the brink of unprecedented tension. On 12 April, Prime Minister S. Takaichi, speaking at a convention of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, once again asked for a one-year postponement to prepare a draft of the new version of the article.

At the beginning of April, the government introduced a new export control procedure for products of the Japanese military-industrial complex. In fact, this actually means lifting the ban on the sale of ‘lethal’ weapons abroad. The jury is still out on the role of the Japanese parliament, and whether it will play any, in the practical implementation of these new defence export rules.

Japan’s regional military-political activity

The lifting of the ban on the export of ‘lethal’ weapons is directly linked to the process of forging quasi-allied relations between Japan and Australia.

These relations per se are an important factor in transforming the situation in the Indo-Pacific region. An example illustrating the tendency is the agreement to supply the Australian navy with eleven of the latest Mogami-class frigates, which promises to bring unprecedented revenue to the Japanese defence industry.

In general, the defence departments of the two countries have been interacting in an even closer way. This is evidenced, in particular, by the second visit to Tokyo in the last four months by Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, R. Marles, which took place at the beginning of April. Following talks with his Japanese counterpart, S. Koizumi, both ministers made important statements at a joint press conference. In particular, they announced plans to conduct joint military exercises, both those already held and those scheduled for 2026.

Strengthening ties in the Asia-Pacific region: Japan seeks new alliances amid Chinese wariness

The upcoming visit of Japanese Prime Minister S. Takaichi to Australia is intended to bolster bilateral relations. The main stated goal of the visit is to discuss issues related to rare earth metals, which has already become a kind of ‘magic meme’ in terms of relations with China.

Beijing, undoubtedly, is beholding with growing wariness the expansion of Japan’s military-political presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Of particular concern is Southeast Asia, where China already has long-standing and complex relations with a number of neighbouring countries, primarily the Philippines. Along with Australia, the Philippines is becoming one of the key targets of Japan’s heightened attention, which is met with a positive response from Manila.

The accelerating Japanese-Philippine rapprochement is vividly illustrated by the annual ‘Balikatan’ (‘Shoulder to Shoulder’) international military exercises. The current drills, taking place from 20 April to 8 May on Philippine territory and in adjacent maritime areas, have a number of notable features that deserve to be analyzed and examined separately. It is worth noting here the symbolic statement made by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General R. Browner, prior to the onset of the exercises: ‘Eighty-one years later (after the end of the Second World War), Japanese troops will for the first time set foot on Philippine soil again. Previously we used to be in different camps; today we are sharing the side.’

Despite the fact that Japan’s strengthening of its presence in the Asia-Pacific is obviously oriented against China, Tokyo is trying to avoid an irreversible deterioration in relations with Beijing. There are several reasons for this, with the most important of them being China remaining Japan’s key trade and economic partner. This particular situation, paradoxical at first glance, is fairly typical of China’s ties with almost all the countries in the region.

This state of affairs is partially reminiscent of an Eastern bazaar, where personal relations between seller and buyer do not impede mutually beneficial deals. Moreover, successful cooperation can even contribute to improving the relations themselves.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific region issues. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/04/23/japan-is-becoming-more-active-in-southeast-asia/