On 6 May 2026, the South Korean Ministry of Unification held a briefing where it presented key changes to the DPRK’s Constitution, adopted earlier that year, to journalists and experts.

The main amendments include a definitive abandonment of the reunification paradigm, the removal of outdated rhetoric, and a certain strengthening of the power of the country’s top leader.

The DPRK’s constitutional development traces its history back to September 1948, to the adoption of its first constitution. In 1972, the so-called ‘Socialist Constitution’ was adopted, which was subsequently amended many times. According to available information, in March 2026 the Supreme People’s Assembly introduced twelve amendments to it and removed the word ‘socialist’ from its title.

Critical remarks and context

It is important to note that the author of this text is not completely certain of the authenticity of the presented ‘North Korean original.’ Moreover, the text per se has not been published in open sources, which forces us to rely on journalists’ retellings. This circumstance raises doubts about the one-hundred-percent authenticity of the document presented in Seoul, which may have been subjected to propagandistic distortions.

The Ministry of Unification and South Korean intelligence services have repeatedly disclosed the contents of documents that were subsequently known only from South Korean sources. One example is the law on combating foreign culture, under which listening to K-pop could invoke severe punishment, including execution.

Nevertheless, if we assume that the information provided by Ministry representatives is accurate, the new package of amendments fits logically into the process initiated at the end of 2023, when the DPRK abandoned the concept of reunification. Around the same time, a certain renewal of the country’s domestic political rhetoric also began.

Recognition of the reality of borders

The main thing that drew attention in the ROK is that North Korea has defined its territory as the lands bordering China and Russia to the north and South Korea to the south, together with adjacent territorial waters and airspace. In other words, the state’s territory is limited to exactly the territory it has actually controlled since 1953. However, the specific land and maritime borders are not delineated.

All rhetoric concerning the ‘reunification of the fatherland’ has also been removed, even when that topic appeared in descriptions of the achievements and goals of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. The article declaring the aspiration ‘to reunify the country based on the principles of independence, peaceful unification, and great national unity’ has disappeared from the Constitution. This is a logical continuation of the trend from 2023, when the term ‘South Korea’ (which was effectively used as ‘the southern part of the DPRK,’ Nam Choson) was replaced by the country’s own name, Hanguk, to indicate the existence on the Korean peninsula of two different and mutually hostile states. At the same time, the outline of the entire Korean peninsula in North Korean symbolism was replaced by an image of the DPRK within its classic borders.

On the other hand, although Seoul expected that after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un repeatedly called Seoul an enemy, the status of the ROK as ‘enemy number one’ subject to destruction in the event of war would be enshrined in the constitution, thereby making Pyongyang’s stance immutable, this did not happen.

However, the issue of the disputed maritime border in the Yellow Sea remains unclear, given that the North does not recognize the so-called Northern Limit Line unilaterally drawn by the ROK. This is important, because in the twenty-first century most actual clashes between the two countries have occurred precisely in that region, and the constitution emphasises that the DPRK will not tolerate any violation of its territory.

South Korean experts noted that the amendments underline Pyongyang’s commitment to a policy of ‘two hostile states’ and lay the foundation for ‘peaceful coexistence’ between the two Koreas, but the author feels that they are, as usual, projecting their own wishes onto reality.

What matters more is something else. The absence of any mention of South Korea as an enemy in the constitution removes the question of how to deal with this enemy. Declaring someone enemy number one implies their eventual defeat and destruction, but with regard to the ROK, the North Korean position is different: recognition of the existence of two hostile states on the peninsula does not imply a desire for a second Korean war unless the other side starts it. Rather, the North seeks to avoid interaction with the South by establishing a regime of ‘non-peaceful coexistence’.

Moreover, this approach awards the North with greater freedom of manoeuvre.

The Chairman of State Affairs – head of state

Although the South Korean wording ‘for the first time’ is inaccurate, the revised wording makes it clearer that the Chairman of State Affairs of the DPRK (the post held by Kim Jong-un) is the head of state (rather than ‘the supreme leader representing the state’ as before), may veto laws and regulations adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly, and appoints both the Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly and the Prime Minister. Furthermore, whereas previously the Supreme People’s Assembly, which elected him to the post, could theoretically recall him, it is now deprived of that right.

In addition, a new clause has been added giving the Chairman of State Affairs command over the country’s nuclear forces, including the power to delegate these authorities. Of course, Kim is already the Supreme Commander, so the author finds the aspect of delegating more interesting.

The Constitution is no longer ‘socialist’, but socialism remains

What drew the most attention in left-wing circles is that all expressions of the type ‘complete victory of socialism’, ‘free healthcare’, ‘a country without taxes’, ‘a country where unemployment does not exist’ and so on have been completely removed from the preamble and the text of the Constitution.

Allegedly, the descriptions of the achievements of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il have also been removed, without being replaced by praise for the current leader. The preamble supposedly no longer mentions ‘Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism’, replaced by Kim Jong-un’s policy of ‘putting the popular masses first’.

Finally, ‘militant ideological expressions’ such as ‘imperialist aggressors’, ‘liberation from exploitation and oppression’, ‘destructive machinations of domestic and foreign hostile elements’ and so on have disappeared.

Of course, this has triggered a wave of lamentations that the DPRK has ‘abandoned the construction of socialism’, but in the author’s opinion, such amendments rather show a desire to acknowledge the real state of affairs and a readiness to abandon those elements of rhetoric and ideology that were relevant in their time but have now become morally obsolete.

After the ‘arduous march’, much existed only on paper. In this regard, it is revealing that the article of the constitution which previously stated that ‘the state provides the people with a prosperous and civilized standard of living’ now reads that ‘the state fights’ to provide such conditions. More honest and realistic, especially given how harshly Kim Jong-un spoke about the difference in living standards between the centre and the periphery.

South Korean reaction

On 7 May 2026, the administration of the ROK President stated that it would carefully examine the changes made to the North Korean Constitution. However, ‘regardless of the changes made to the North Korean basic law, Seoul will continue consistently to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula’.

The National Intelligence Service also conducted an analysis of the text during a closed briefing to the parliamentary intelligence committee, and concluded that although the Constitution states that the North will never tolerate any encroachment on its territory bordering the Republic of Korea, the absence of hostile language towards the South ‘has significantly reduced Pyongyang’s hostility’: the North clearly seeks to sever relations with the South, but signals an intention to maintain the status quo and manage the situation rather than take an offensive stance.

A North Korea expert, Professor Lee Jong ?hul of Seoul National University, stated that the constitution ‘signals Pyongyang’s readiness to create the image of a “normal” state’.

Summary

Of course, the author hopes that the further development of relations between the DPRK and the Russian Federation will lead to such documents being accessible to Russian scholars not through South Korean retellings, and if the Seoul officials have not added anything of their own, the presented text appears to put on paper a number of real trends: centralization of power, setting realistic goals, elimination of outdated rhetoric while keeping the socialist orientation unchanged, and strengthening Kim Jong-un’s powers.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Lead Researcher at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/05/12/on-the-new-constitution-of-the-dprk/