The US-Israeli war against Iran forced Turkey into a difficult choice: condemn the aggression without backing Tehran, maintain neutrality while still extracting strategic benefits from the new regional order.

Turkey’s Interest and Lessons from the US-Israeli War on Iran

At the beginning of the US-Israeli war on Iran on February 28, Recep Tayyip Erdogan condoled the assassination of Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and described the US and Israeli attack on Iran as a clear violation of international law. In contrast, he considered Iran’s retaliatory attacks on the Persian Gulf countries unacceptable.

In March, despite reports that Iran had fired ballistic missiles at Turkey, Ankara repeatedly emphasized its neutrality, stating that it would not enter into an anti-Iranian conflict and was aware of efforts to ignite the flames of war.

Certainly, as a western neighbour with a 560-kilometer border, Turkey can be widely affected by any domestic and security developments in Iran. Therefore, by opposing foreign military intervention in Iran, it shows its concern about the wave of migration, power vacuum, and long-term instability in the region. Despite some political and ideological differences with Iran, Turkey does not want Iran to become a secular and Western-oriented country in general.

Turkey and Israel have taken different positions on the Iran war. Turkey has many concerns about Israel and fears negative “provocation” from the Netanyahu government regarding war and peace between the US and Iran. After the war with Iran, Israel has increased its defense cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, targetted bases in Syria, and increased its presence in Lebanon.

Turkey fears the warning “Turkey is the new Iran” and plans such as expanding the sphere of Israeli influence “to Damascus”, the idea of ??a Greater Israel, the plan of an Israel-India-Greece-Cyprus alliance against Turkey in February 2026 as a source of threat to the whole world, a wider presence of Tel Aviv over influence in the Caucasus and the Mediterranean gas fields, and more direct strategic confrontations in regional areas.

From this perspective, any opportunity arising from the Iran-Israel war is an opportunity to expand pressure on Turkey and the possibility of an Israeli attack on Turkey to the detriment of Ankara. In another dimension, Ankara is worried about the backstage of the war against Iran, new security threats and new imperialist plans, igniting the fire of discord between ethnicities in the region, arming Kurdish militias for the war with Iran and separatist policies in the region.

By emphasizing the need to stop the war between Iran and the United States, using its relations with the United States, Iran and Pakistan, activating regional diplomacy, and supporting diplomacy and dialogue, Ankara has tried to play a mediating role in the process of diplomatic efforts, including in Islamabad.

While the Turkish economy is going through more difficult conditions in the second quarter of this year and the growth rate has fallen below 1 percent, inflation is rising, and Ankara is facing both the outflow of foreign investors between 25 and 30 billion dollars and a deficit. Turkey remains concerned about the broader negative effects of the attack on Iran on the Turkish economy. In addition, although Iranian gas exports to Turkey grew by 26% in the two months of the war to 2.7 billion cubic meters, it is important for Turkey not to lose bilateral trade ($6.5 billion by October 2025) and to secure Iranian gas supplies.

Turkey is not heavily dependent on the Strait of Hormuz, except for some imports of liquefied natural gas from Qatar. However, Ankara is considering the importance of restoring free shipping conditions in the Strait of Hormuz to pre-war conditions and ensuring free passage of all ships as before the war. Also, in the Hormuz dilemma, Turkey “cautiously” and “pragmatically” does not want a new regional order in which Iran becomes completely hegemonic.

In fact, while Arab actors are reassessing their national security architecture and defense relations and reducing their exclusive dependence on the United States, Ankara sees Turkish cooperation with the Persian Gulf states as an opportunity to strengthen its presence, supplying arms and security partners and redesigning trade routes.

While the US war against Iran and the US’s fluctuating behaviour left its allies in the midst of uncertainty, many in Turkey considered Iran’s indigenous defense power and Tehran’s military power as a counterweight to Turkey’s economic, defense, and institutional fragility. Therefore, the military war against Iran has changed Turkey’s perception of the threat and defense priorities. Some Turkish security circles, looking at Iran’s successes in social resilience and seizing opportunities, have called for a fundamental revision of the country’s defense strategy.

The Turkish government is likely to adopt a comprehensive security doctrine that strengthens a sustainable defense-industrial capacity, strengthens the protection of critical infrastructure, and improves resilience, encompassing military, cyber, electronic, information, and psychological dimensions.

Ankara is trying to take into account the wide difference between the US-Israeli relations and interests. In this situation, the meetings and discussions between American and Turkish officials in the past few months on the Strait of Hormuz and regional wars, etc., are happening while Ankara hopes that Trump will participate in the NATO summit in Ankara in July.

Also, from this point of view, although Turkey still needs the NATO umbrella, the necessity of “depth” in the modern defense and war industry and having military technologies independent of NATO and the United States, and the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile of the Strategic Independence Doctrine, has become more prominent.

In addition, despite the tensions between key NATO members and the European Union and the United States, Turkey may try to exploit regional and international opportunities, differences and conflicts.

Outlook

The Iran war fundamentally redefines politics in the Middle East, the regional status, and Turkey’s role in the region. The war against Iran has imposed costs on Ankara, including a severe energy crisis, but it has also created new strategic opportunities.

A strong Iran may further limit Ankara’s regional manoeuvring space, but Turkey and Iran, historical rivals in the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, are committed to their pragmatic interests in preventing an escalation of conflict and preserving their national interests. Many in Iran have praised Turkey’s Israeli stances and emphasized the two nations’ unity in supporting the Islamic world.

Certainly, if Washington and Tehran move toward a full understanding, Turkey’s interests in a managed de-escalation could become more. The global consequences of Iran’s geopolitical victory also extend to the Eurasian bloc, especially Russia and China. The limitations of Ankara’s reunification with Washington will become more apparent. Therefore, Ankara will probably want to be more independent of the West and, by increasing its strategic independence and reviewing the international order and diplomacy, will not downgrade itself solely to Western priorities.

Samyar Rostami, ? political observer and senior researcher in international relations. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/06/23/turkeys-interest-and-lessons-from-the-us-israeli-war-on-iran/