The signing of memorandums between Turkey and Saudi Arabia to revive the historic Hejaz Railway and establish a fibre-optic corridor marks the beginning of a major transport project that could reshape the Middle East’s logistics map and challenge existing routes through Iran, Iraq, and Israel.

The Status of the Turkey-Saudi Arabia Corridor

Decades after the bilateral water and energy corridor plan between Turkey and the GCC and the Hejaz Railway rehabilitation plan by Turkey in 2009, Turkey’s hopes for the Turkish-Arab transport corridor have increased. On June 9, 2026, Turkey and Saudi Arabia signed two important memorandums of understanding (MoU) to revive the historic Hejaz Railway corridor through Syria and Jordan and to establish a terrestrial fibre optic route, providing six $800 million terrestrial fibre corridors from Saudi Arabia to Turkey.

Turkey’s efforts to establish itself as a transit hub for transport and logistics between Europe and Asia have intensified. Meanwhile, the 127-kilometer-long “Istanbul North Rail Corridor” or INRAIL project is set to connect the two sides of the Bosphorus and increase the rail capacity of the Bosphorus from three million tons per year to about 50 million tons.

Also, Turkey’s hopes for a $6-7 billion loan from Islamic financial institutions and oil-rich Arab countries to further develop corridors in line with Turkey’s national interests have intensified. With the new geopolitical changes, the US war in the Persian Gulf, and the restriction of passage through the Strait of Hormuz, Turkey has increased its efforts to maintain stability, or a “survival strategy,” and preserve Turkish trade.

In fact, Turkey’s interest in various options to strengthen regional connectivity through Syria, transfer energy, goods, and food, reactivate regional land and rail transportation projects to support supply chains, and provide alternatives to the Hormuz and Red Sea routes has expanded significantly. So, in recent months, Turkey’s transit interactions with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to develop corridors have also expanded notably.

In a multilateral format, Turkey, Syria, and Jordan signed a trilateral memorandum of understanding on April 7, 2026, to revive the railway connection by reconstructing the lost infrastructure in Syria and improving the transport and logistics sectors between the three countries. In fact, establishing an institutional and technical framework, forming joint committees and working groups, and preparing integrated sectoral plans to coordinate efforts and transform understandings into operational projects with investment support and full exploitation of the rail line along the Turkey-Syria-Jordan axis will multiply the export potential and transit revenues of all three countries.

Syria and Jordan also recently reiterated their commitment to increasing cooperation in the economic, trade, transport, and water sectors and deepening their strategic partnership.

The railway project from Riyadh to Istanbul has become more serious following the visit of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Riyadh a few months ago, and in line with the instructions of the technical committees planning to launch an ambitious project.

By coordinating Turkey’s efforts to become a “main transit ring” between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe with the expansion of the role of Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” program, increasing official visits between Ankara and Riyadh, the Turkey-Saudi Arabia corridor could serve to increase trade by $50 billion between the two sides.

The Turkey-Saudi Arabia corridor aims to reduce transportation costs by 20-30% and reduce transit time to 6 days, possibly connecting to Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen, linking the corridor with the NEOM project, and creating long-term strategic partnerships centred on the railway project. The total investment in this corridor is estimated at $5.5 billion, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has already allocated $750 million for the Turkish section of the route.

Apart from Jordan’s infrastructure projects, which include the construction of railway lines and large-scale projects, future cooperation between Turkey and Jordan could also increase trade volume between the two countries beyond $1.5 billion (in 2025). Apart from Jordan’s interests, Syria also sees the use of the corridors as a means to finance the annual economic benefits of at least $500 million from road traffic transit between Turkey and Jordan and economic integration.

Syria aims to establish itself as a logistics chain by taking advantage of its geographical location and a series of transport and railway agreements with Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Syria-Saudi Arabia communication has increased on ways to develop bilateral cooperation in the fields of land and rail transport and coordination with Turkey’s regional connectivity projects.

In the meantime, customs laws, road repairs, and visa procedures are to be harmonized in the first step, and the crossing from Syrian territory to Jordan and the Persian Gulf will be fully operational in 2026. As Jordanian trucks crossed into Turkey for the first time in almost 15 years.

Simultaneous bypass of Iran, Iraq, and Israel

Any possibility of building a new route would allow Turkey to diversify its supply sources, reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, and strengthen its resilience to geopolitical risks on maritime trade routes. If the main goals of the Turkey-Saudi Arabia transport corridor are to diversify transport routes, reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, and provide a safe option for transporting goods, oil, natural gas, and passengers, it could effectively bypass the Iranian, Iraqi, and Israeli corridors.

While the dependence of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) on the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia is important, in contrast, Turkey, with the cooperation model of Ankara, Riyadh, Islamabad, and Cairo, continues to exert economic pressure on Israel, criticizing Israeli policies, and so on. Therefore, the Saudi-Turkish corridor bypasses IMEC as a competitor and aims to reduce Israel’s influence in the region.

Also, the Saudi-Turkish road-rail corridor could have a negative impact on the plans of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Iran, and multilateral corridors through Iraq, such as the “Development Road” project.

Any complete elimination of Hormuz from the Saudi-Turkish corridor could reduce transit of goods through the territory of Iran and Iraq and the sectors related to transportation, logistics, and related services of port and rail services, reduce transit revenues of Iranian and Iraqi ports, and weaken transit-related industries.

If the construction of the Turkey-Saudi Arabia corridor is accelerated, Tehran and Baghdad will need to re-evaluate the economic and logistical feasibility, update the projects, and adapt to the region’s geopolitical and geo-economic developments, in line with their national and economic goals.

Outlook

Even if the feasibility studies for the Turkey-Saudi Arabia railway are completed, it will require financial commitments from governments, resolving possible political tensions, securing funding, achieving security in sensitive areas, cooperating with financial institutions, and attracting investment.

In addition to its geographical advantage, developing rail infrastructure, removing operational bottlenecks, facilitating border procedures, and creating new transportation capacities, Eurasia has become more important in the transit network. But Iran and Iraq still have better geographical and natural conditions than the Turkey-Saudi Arabia corridor. The Turkey-Syria-Jordan-Saudi Arabia rail and road corridor plan cannot yet be a cheaper alternative to much cheaper (sometimes 10 times) sea routes.

Therefore, the proposed corridor is likely to become an operational land route for trucks from Turkey to Jordan and the Red Sea coasts of Saudi Arabia in the short term. However, creating the corridor rail route requires overcoming all the multidimensional obstacles. However, major disruptions in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz may broaden attention to the Türkiye-Syria-Jordan-Saudi Arabia corridor.

Samyar Rostami, a political observer and senior researcher in international relations. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/06/30/interests-of-the-actors-in-the-turkey-saudi-arabia-transport-corridor/