?ny more convergent approaches with the United States or participation in military pressure or economic blockade could put Japan on the verge of losing the “asset” of its traditional friendly relations with Iran.

After the end of World War II, Japan’s foreign policy has practically followed that of the United States. Japan’s policy in the Middle East is mainly influenced by variables such as its strategic alliance with the United States, the supply of fossil fuels, the preservation and promotion of national interests, and the fight against terrorism.

With the beginning of the US and Israeli attack on Iran in late February 2026, Tokyo adopted a diplomatic and cautious tone. Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae refused to explicitly approve or condemn the Israeli and American operations. In a parliamentary session, Takaichi called Iran’s nuclear program “completely unacceptable.”

In another aspect, Tokyo described the dialogue between the United States and Iran in a statement as “very important for resolving this issue.” While pursuing the return of its citizens home from Iran, Tokyo also showed its alignment with Washington by not getting further involved in the conflict and by keeping its lines of communication with Iran open.

Although the Iranian embassy in Japan called on Japan to “resolutely” confront the United States and Israel over their joint attacks on Iran, Tokyo, apart from “expressing condolences and sympathy to the Iranian people,” refused to endorse or explicitly condemn the US and Israeli operations.

Tehran, while considering the insecurity created in the Strait of Hormuz as a direct result of the Western-imposed war against Iran, has emphasized the need for all governments to adopt a responsible approach to prevent the current situation from becoming more complicated. Tokyo has called on Iran to stop attacks on neighbouring countries and the development of its nuclear weapons and to ensure security in the Strait of Hormuz.

Also, previously, Donald Trump called on Japan and other countries to help escort tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. However, from Tokyo’s perspective, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz was not “a survival-threatening situation” that would allow Tokyo to exercise its right to collective defense.

In fact, in the numerous phone calls between the leaders of Japan and Iran (June 1, 2026), (April 30, 2026, April 8), and the phone calls between the foreign ministers of Japan and Iran on (June 15, May 2026; April 2026; March 17, 2026; and March 9, 2026), efforts were made to help reduce tensions and resolve the crisis through negotiations, close communication, and continuous exchange of views.

Polls showed that 75 to 82 percent of Japanese respondents do not support the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, yet Tokyo expects maximum flexibility from Iran and a “final agreement” between Iran and the US. An important part of Japan’s foreign policy concerns is the confrontation between Iran and the US in the Middle East, and it has tried to mediate the conflict to some extent by maintaining a balance on the issue of Iran and the US.

As it was welcomed on June 15, the agreement on the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran is seen as a major step towards resolving the situation.

Japan’s efforts to protect its interests and the important strategic oil and energy shipping lanes from the Middle East are based on the importance of ensuring “free and safe” navigation through the Strait of Hormuz as soon as possible. As in the April 30 telephone conversation between the leaders of Iran and Japan, Tokyo considered the expectation of reaching a final agreement on free and safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz a positive development.

Japan is one of the largest importers of liquefied natural gas and the third largest importer of petroleum products and crude oil in the world. Tokyo imports more than 93 percent of its crude oil from the Strait of Hormuz.

Therefore, in diversifying energy sources, and ensuring the security and stability of the energy market, the complete security of energy transport routes from the Middle East, Strait of Hormuz, is very significant for Japan.

In the geopolitical dimension, addressing global challenges to maintain and promote Japan’s national interests in the Middle East is also a priority for Japan’s foreign policy. The Middle East is geographically much closer than Europe and the United States. With the adoption of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), Japan is trying to take on a greater responsibility and role in the Middle East than in the past.

Tehran’s approach

Previously, the Japanese Prime Minister thanked Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in a phone call for allowing the Japanese ship to pass through the Strait of Hormuz and called for the safe passage of other Japanese ships through this strategic waterway.

In the book “Iran and Japan on the Path of History” by Abbas Araghchi, a kind of historical mutual respect, deep-rooted cultural kinship, and a common understanding of the dignity of civilization are expressed. So, about $3 billion in assets from the sale of Iranian oil has been blocked by Japan. Tehran practically welcomes the facilitation approach to the Iran-US agreement.

There is also criticism of Japan’s approach to Iran. Some believe that hostile US forces have been sent from Japan to attack Iran or that Japan is an important cog in the global network of Western imperialist violence. Some media and public opinion in Iran believe that, given the country’s past positions against Iranian interests, in line with US sanctions and pressure, it is collecting information from Iran through its development agency for the United States. In addition, it supported resolutions against Iran in the UN. Enjoying security in the Strait of Hormuz should be conditional on mutual understanding and cooperation.

From the perspective of many in Tehran, Japan can safely pass its oil through the Strait of Hormuz if it does not support the US war. However, Tokyo’s room for manoeuvre is more limited. But Japan can maintain its role as a bridge between the United States and Iran, as it did in 2019.

The US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the return of sanctions caused many Japanese companies to suspend their plans, and imports of Iranian oil gradually ended. The volume of trade between the two countries has sharply decreased in 2025, estimated at about $84 million. With any geopolitical developments, the availability of an Iran-US agreement could expand trade between Tehran and Tokyo. Recently, Iran has been considering selling oil to Japan and has begun talks to sell oil to Japanese companies.

Tokyo’s main challenge is how to reconcile the multiple variables of loyalty to the alliance with the United States, economic dependence on Middle Eastern oil, and a pacifist Constitution. The widespread conflict in the Persian Gulf will certainly complicate Prime Minister Takaichi’s efforts to implement her political agenda and revive the Japanese economy.

In fact, Japan has so far treaded carefully between its alliance with the United States and its ties with Iran. It has kept its distance from military intervention and has practically not stood up to Iran. But any more convergent approaches with the United States or participation in military pressure or economic blockade could put Japan on the verge of losing the “asset” of its traditional friendly relations with Iran.

Samyar Rostami, ? political observer and senior researcher in international relations. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/07/24/tehrans-approach-and-japans-balance-between-the-us-and-iran/