Instead of simply asking the West for protection, Riyadh is building an alternative. And that is shifting the balance of power in the Middle East.

When the charter-signing ceremony for the new maritime coalition opened in Riyadh on July 30, the numbers spoke louder than any speech. Of the 51 nations invited, 43 sent representatives - but only 14 actually signed the final document. At first glance, that looks like a diplomatic shortfall. In reality, it is a finely calibrated geopolitical calculation, one that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has turned into an art form.

The new coalition - officially established to protect the maritime environment in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden - has already acquired a slew of labels. Some call it the “Arab Maritime Coalition”; others, the “Islamic Naval Alliance.” This name confusion is not a bureaucratic error but a deliberate ambiguity, allowing each member to interpret its participation in whatever way suits it best.

Why Does Saudi Arabia Need Its Own Fleet?

For Riyadh, this project is not just about patrolling waters. It is part of a regional security architecture that Saudi Arabia is writing with its own hand. By bringing together 14 founding states under its chairmanship, the Kingdom is sending a clear signal: the Gulf and Red Sea states no longer want to be mere passengers on Western warships. They intend to take the helm.

“We can no longer rely on outside powers for our security. It is time for the region to take responsibility for its own waters into its own hands,” Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman said in an interview with Saudi TV channel Al Arabiya shortly after the ceremony.

This message is directed not only at Tehran, which has traditionally viewed the Gulf as its sphere of influence. It is also a signal to Washington and Brussels: Saudi Arabia is ceasing to be a mere “consumer” of security and is becoming a full-fledged “provider” of it in the region.

The Art of Saying Everything and Nothing at Once

The coalition’s charter is notably restrained. It contains no mention of adversaries, no mutual-defense clause (like NATO’s Article 5), and its mandates are limited strictly to protecting freedom of navigation. It is precisely this deliberate vagueness that made it possible to bring such disparate allies to the same table.

Egypt and Türkeyi - rivals on many other issues - now sit side by side here. Pakistan and Bangladesh, which have tense relations with India, find common ground in the Red Sea. Nigeria, far removed from Middle Eastern feuds, joins in to protect its own economic interests. Had the charter been a hardline anti-Iranian manifesto, half of these countries would never have signed it.

Western military strategists have already dubbed this coalition a “complement” to existing missions, such as Operation Prosperity Guardian, which the US deployed to counter Houthi attacks. But Riyadh sees things differently: this is not a support force, but a parallel structure. Regional states are willing to coordinate with the West - but not to take orders from it.

The View from the Other Side: What the Houthis Think

Yemen’s Houthi movement is naturally not mentioned in the charter, but it is precisely against their tactics of “maritime blockade” that this coalition is aimed. Since the escalation of the Gaza conflict, the Houthis have turned attacks on commercial shipping into a key tool for pressuring the international community.

“Any military formation led by Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea is a threat to regional stability and will be treated as a hostile act,” senior Houthi official Mohammed Ali al-Houthi commented on the coalition’s creation in a press statement on August 2.

Significantly, for the Houthis, whether or not their name appears in the text is irrelevant. They understand perfectly well why this group has been assembled. Yet within this openness of purpose lies a source of strength: the Houthis will now be dealing not with a vague American presence, but with a concrete regional bloc that has its own territorial interests.

Core and Periphery: Why Didn’t Everyone Sign?

The gap between the 43 participants at the ceremony and the 14 signatories reflects a strategy of “concentric circles.” Saudi Arabia has created a hard core - countries ready to take on binding commitments immediately - while leaving room for expansion. It is a smart move: the coalition is not closed, and other states can join later, when the political climate becomes more favourable.

Key regional players held back from the initiative, and their reasons for abstaining run deeper than simple reluctance to put pen to paper.

The UAE, which took part in the talks, left without making any commitments. Their choice stems not from opposition to the idea of security per se, but from a desire to preserve freedom of manoeuvre - Abu Dhabi prefers tailored partnerships over rigid frameworks where Riyadh sets the tone. Oman, for its part, values its role as an impartial intermediary between the West and Tehran, and even a defensive alliance would deprive Muscat of that unique status, making it a party to one side.

Beijing, with its vast commercial interests and its own base in Djibouti, is not ready to commit to a document where its voice would not be decisive. For China, Red Sea security is an economic imperative, but it intends to pursue it through diplomatic channels, not by joining an alliance under Saudi auspices.

The Invisible Four

Among the 14 founders, an informal leadership group stands out: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. These four countries possess real military capabilities, developed naval bases, and a critical dependence on maritime routes.

For Egypt, the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a matter of economic life and death. Disruptions to shipping mean lost revenues from the Suez Canal - revenues that already suffered in 2025 due to ships being rerouted around Africa. For Turkey, which aspires to become an energy hub, supply stability is priority number one. Pakistan, in turn, views the Red Sea as a logistical bridge to its allies in the Gulf.

These four nations will define the coalition’s tactical flexibility. When - not if - a serious maritime incident occurs, they will be the ones to decide on the use of force. The formal equality of the 14 nations will dissolve, and real geopolitical weight will take centre stage.

The Price of Leadership

By building this coalition, Saudi Arabia is not merely gaining leverage. It is taking on enormous responsibility. If coalition vessels operating under Riyadh’s leadership fail to prevent a major attack on a tanker, or if a ship-unblocking operation ends in failure, the blow will land squarely on Saudi credibility.

The Kingdom is changing its playbook: it no longer hides behind the US Fifth Fleet. “Vision 2030,” the Crown Prince’s economic program, places maritime trade at the forefront. Saudi oil, Saudi fertilizers, Saudi exports - all of it now depend on the safety of these waters, which Saudi Arabia pledges to secure on its own.

US Relations: Partnership or Competition?

The big question still gnawing at analysts in Washington remains: does this coalition meet the longstanding US demand that allies carry more of the load?

Officially, the answer is yes. A regional structure operating parallel to Western missions is exactly what American presidents have been asking for over the past two decades. Unofficially, it is a risk. By creating an alternative, Saudi Arabia is reducing its dependence on external security guarantees. And that means that, a few years from now, the US may have little leverage left over Riyadh on issues like oil quotas or the push toward rapprochement with Israel.

In this sense, the new coalition is not just a response to Houthi attacks. It is the Kingdom’s mature recognition that the global order is changing - and that, in this new world, every player must know how to defend its own interests, bringing in allies only when truly necessary. The era of passive protection is over. The age of regional security architects has begun.

Muhammad ibn Faisal al-Rashid is a political scientist and expert on the Arab world. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/08/11/red-sea-under-a-new-flag-why-saudi-arabia-is-assembling-its-own-maritime-coalition/