Iran’s future response will likely entail close monitoring of both the opportunities and threats posed by the Mecca Pact. Tehran is also expected to welcome any cooperative frameworks directed against Israeli and Western interests, as well as intra-Islamic collaboration.

Following a year of intensive diplomatic consultations in Mecca, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan formally signed a trilateral joint defense agreement, dubbed the “Mecca Agreement,” on August 7, 2026. This landmark pact unequivocally ranks as the most consequential defense and military development to have shaped the region in recent years.

The cornerstone clause of the “Mecca Agreement” rests squarely on the principle of collective self-defense, explicitly dictating that an armed attack against any of the three state parties shall be construed as an attack on all parties to the accord. The pact was signed on the basis of a preliminary agreement reached between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in September of the previous year.

The driving factors behind the formation of this trilateral alliance can be traced to several key developments: shared security concerns across the Middle East, the US–Israeli military threat against Iran, grave apprehensions regarding Riyadh’s capacity to safeguard its domestic security and sustain its oil exports, and a direct reaction to Israel’s regional posture.

Motivations such as the deepening distrust towards Washington’s protective umbrella, rapid military developments, the severe erosion of traditional deterrence in the region, recent military conflicts, and the attacks by Israel and the US on Iran are also important. For Arab countries, reducing complete dependence on a single external guarantor is meaningful. Saudi Arabia also takes seriously threats related to forces aligned with Iran.

Implications for Iran

For Iran, the main real risk is any pact turning into a permanent, multi-layered, and anti-Iranian security network. Certainly, the formation of any regional anti-Iranian security network will complicate Iran’s peripheral environment.

Through official statements and explanations from Turkey and Saudi Arabia, efforts have largely been made to distance the agreement from an anti-Iranian coalition. The emphasis on its defensive nature, the avoidance of targetting any specific country, and the possibility of other regional countries joining, indicate that the designers of the agreement do not intend to turn it into a pact against Iran.

While Iran is not explicitly referenced in the text of the accord, the consequent increase in military coordination will inevitably shape Tehran’s strategic calculus. The “Mecca Agreement,” although at the legal and military level it still lacks clear operational details, but from a geopolitical perspective, the role and presence of the three neighbours is important for Iran. Within the framework of Washington’s strategy against Iran, the formation of regional coalitions is considered a necessity.

Meanwhile, some in Iran analyze the agreement within the framework of America’s larger strategy to create regional coalitions against Iran. From the perspective of some Iranian sources, what was signed in Mecca is less a real strategic shift in the region’s security architecture and more a repetition of a tested pattern.

Others, including Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of Iran’s parliament, criticized the pact. He wrote: “The Saudis should know that an agreement on paper with Turkey and Pakistan will not bring them security, just as years of unilateral dependence on the Americans did not bring them security.”

If this agreement leads to joint exercises, information exchange, integration of parts of defense systems, defense industry cooperation, political coordination, and then the entry of new members, then we will witness the emergence of a multi-layered regional security network against Iran that, without the direct presence of the US and NATO, organizes part of the pressure.

In the recent message of Seyyed Abbas Araghchi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Iran’s military power has been stated on the field against the most advanced military force in the world. That is, if part of the calculations surrounding the Mecca Pact is to increase posturing against Iran, Tehran is stating that the power equation is not merely about the number of pacts and the number of partners.

In another dimension, from the viewpoint of the founders of the Mecca Agreement, it is not “indicative of an attempt to create a military axis or a sectarian bloc” and is not considered a “threat to the security of any country in the region.” It further appears that the “Mecca Joint Defense Pact” remains open to accession by other states within the region.

From this view, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted for Iran and its regional role as shaping an endogenous regional order with the participation of the major powers. As Araghchi says: “When Muslims stand united and cohesive alongside one another, they can stand with strength and decisiveness against any challenge created by malevolent outsiders.”

In fact, Tehran speaks of a more comprehensive and intra-regional collective security, so it does not negate the principle of defensive cooperation among Muslim countries. Therefore, “self-reliance,” “neighbourhood,” and “genuine brotherhood” are important, not dependence on external powers.

Overall, Tehran considers deterrence and confidence in national power, welcoming convergence and cooperation among Muslim countries, and proposing a security model based on regional self-reliance and reducing dependence on external powers as beneficial.

Therefore, Tehran will probably pursue several axes: the secret provisions and operational mechanism of collective defense; the establishment of a joint command or coordination centre; intelligence cooperation and sharing of identification data; the deployment of Turkish and Pakistani forces or equipment in Saudi Arabia; and the joining of new countries to this framework.

What is clear is that Iran’s reaction has been neither passive nor confrontational. Tehran has neither introduced the Mecca Pact as an immediate threat nor engaged in verbal warfare against it. Although the pact outwardly has a Sunni-sectarian aspect, Iran nevertheless hopes to regard the Mecca Pact as cooperation among Muslim countries.

From Tehran’s perspective, if the countries of the region move toward more comprehensive mechanisms, security dialogue, and reliance on internal capacities, Iran, due to its privileged geopolitical position, strategic depth, and military capabilities, is not an actor that can be ignored.

In other words, the agreement is not yet an “Islamic NATO” on its own, but the creation of an Islamic security structure could provide a framework for long-term defense cooperation, deterrence, coordination, and integration and create deterrence against Israel. In this regard, Iran considers itself one of the pillars of the region’s future security, and it can even join the Mecca Pact.

Challenges and Prospects

A closer examination of the text of the statement, the timing, and Riyadh’s long history of establishing similar coalitions indicates that the coalition lacks real executive guarantees, with general definitions and without determining clear duties, and is ineffective. The difference in the armament and operational structures of the three countries, “divergence in threat perception,” and identification of a “common enemy” make the operationalization of collective defense obligations among the three countries difficult.

The future of the pact may be planned in the areas of “industrial-defense cooperation,” “technology transfer,” “joint manoeuvres,” and “information exchange,” but its implementation will depend on these three countries’ ability to manage interests and balance against other actors, the extent of members’ commitment to obligations, how the agreement is implemented, and the reaction of other regional and international actors.

What is clear is that the Middle East’s security environment is undergoing transformation, and strengthening diplomatic initiatives, maintaining communication channels with neighbours, preventing the formation of mutual threat perceptions, and the growing tendency toward regional strategic independence have become more broadly important.

The Mecca Pact may be the beginning of a new coalition, but it is still too early to call it merely an anti-Iranian bloc or merely an Islamic NATO. If we consider the Mecca Pact a sign of the beginning of a new phase in the Middle East’s security realignment, it seems that reducing exclusive dependence on the United States and expanding cooperation with regional powers could initiate new balances in the region.

Iran’s future response will likely entail close monitoring of both the opportunities and threats posed by the Mecca Pact. Tehran is also expected to welcome any cooperative frameworks directed against Israeli and Western interests, as well as intra-Islamic collaboration. However, any attempt to steer the Mecca Pact toward sectarian or anti-Iranian objectives will likely be met by Iran with a more coordinated response, in tandem with its regional and international partners.

Samyar Rostami, ? political observer and senior researcher in international relations. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/08/12/irans-interests-and-the-mecca-defense-pact/