On July 24, 2026, an armed group attacked a joint army-police checkpoint in Tank District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan.

The militants attempted to seize the post before driving an explosives-laden vehicle into its perimeter. Twelve servicemen, two police officers, and a former forestry department employee were killed. Pakistani security forces reported killing 12 attackers and blamed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

For Islamabad, the attack again demonstrated the group’s ability to conduct complex operations against fortified positions and inflict heavy losses. Pakistan routinely demands that Kabul close militant camps, detain commanders, and prevent Afghan territory from being used to prepare attacks. Afghan authorities insist they do not allow armed groups to operate against neighbouring states, but Islamabad rejects these assurances. When diplomacy fails, Pakistan resorts to airstrikes, artillery, and border closures; Afghan forces respond by firing on Pakistani positions. Ceasefires follow, but usually last only until the next major attack.

The Durand Line is thus shifting from a disputed border into a zone of recurring armed confrontation. In the second quarter of 2026, terrorist attacks and counterterrorism operations in Pakistan left 774 people dead and 336 wounded. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa accounted for 475 deaths, more than 61 percent of all violence-related fatalities, while another 265 people were killed in Balochistan. The concentration of losses in these two western provinces is increasing pressure on the federal government and military command to demonstrate that they can protect security forces.

Why Kabul Will Not Break with the Pakistani Taliban

The Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are not a single organization. They have separate leadership structures and objectives but are connected by a shared ideology, personal ties among commanders, tribal relationships, and years of cooperation. TTP members supported the Afghan Taliban against the United States and the former Kabul government, providing safe havens, participating in combat, and moving people and weapons across the border.

Islamabad now expects the Afghan authorities to wage a military campaign against former allies. For Kabul, this carries serious risks. A full-scale operation could provoke discontent among field commanders and religious figures, while militants under pressure could defect to Islamic State Khorasan Province* (ISKP). Kabul also cannot openly acknowledge an organized Pakistani militant presence, as this would imply either a lack of territorial control or deliberate provision of sanctuary. It therefore demands evidence and favours negotiations.

Strikes That Broaden the Conflict

Pakistan has gradually expanded its military operations. Previously, most clashes occurred along the Durand Line and affected eastern Afghanistan. In 2026, strikes began reaching deeper into the country.

The gravest episode was the March 16 airstrike on the Omid drug rehabilitation centre in Kabul. According to UN-confirmed figures, 269 civilians were killed and 122 wounded. Amnesty International examined satellite imagery, photographs, video footage, and eyewitness testimony but found no evidence that the centre stored weapons or served a military purpose, and called for an investigation into a possible war crime. Pakistan rejected the findings, saying the target was a military facility linked to terrorist activity and describing the operation as self-defence.

Another escalation came on the night of June 29, when Pakistani forces struck Paktia, Paktika, and Kunar provinces. The United Nations confirmed at least 28 civilian deaths and 49 injuries, including women and children. Such casualties are changing perceptions of the conflict inside Afghanistan. Even when Islamabad says it is targeting militant facilities, civilian deaths fuel anti-Pakistan sentiment and make cooperation with Pakistan politically more difficult for Kabul.

Why Military Superiority Does Not Bring Victory

Pakistan has modern air power, intelligence assets, artillery, and much larger armed forces. It can destroy individual camps, depots, and commanders. The TTP, however, is not a regular army with permanent bases or fixed positions. Its members move among populated areas, rely on family and tribal ties, and use difficult terrain. Some commanders can operate on both sides of the border. Air strikes may destroy individual targets, but they cannot dismantle such a network.

Civilian casualties also strengthen TTP propaganda. The Pakistani Taliban portray themselves as defenders of Pashtuns against the army and use the aftermath of strikes to recruit supporters.

The Border as an Instrument of Pressure

The confrontation now extends beyond security. During escalations, Pakistan closes Torkham, Chaman, and other crossings used by passengers, humanitarian shipments, and a significant share of Afghanistan’s foreign trade. After clashes in autumn 2025, traffic through the main crossings nearly stopped, leaving queues of trucks carrying food and other goods on both sides.

Kabul is therefore accelerating the reorientation of trade toward Iran and Central Asia. Iranian ports are being used more actively, while routes through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are gaining importance. Each closure reinforces the Afghan authorities’ determination to reduce dependence on Pakistan.

Ceasefires That Change Nothing

In autumn 2025, Qatar and Turkey mediated a ceasefire that temporarily reduced clashes and partially restored traffic through Torkham. Yet mediation can stop shooting without removing the underlying cause. It cannot force the Afghan Taliban to fight former allies, nor persuade Pakistan to abandon strikes while its servicemen and police continue to die in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

A sustainable settlement would require intelligence sharing, joint verification of suspected militant sites, and investigations into civilian deaths. No such mechanism currently exists.

A War No One Has Declared

A full-scale confrontation is in neither side’s interest. Afghanistan lacks the resources for a prolonged war against Pakistan’s stronger military, while Pakistan is simultaneously confronting the TTP, Baloch armed groups, and domestic political instability.

The most likely scenario is a limited but recurring conflict. Militants will continue attacking Pakistani security forces; Islamabad will answer with air strikes and border closures; Kabul will respond along the border and accuse Pakistan of aggression. A particularly deadly strike, the death of a senior Afghan official, or a large-scale attack on a major Pakistani city could be enough to push the escalation beyond control.

The conflict can no longer be seen solely as Pakistan’s struggle against one armed organization. It is becoming a protracted confrontation between two states that until recently regarded each other as allies. Until the fight against the Pakistani Taliban is separated from direct military pressure on Afghanistan, the Durand Line will remain a front line.

*a terrorist organization banned in Russia

Roman Perelyaev, Leading Specialist, Center for Scientific and Analytical Information, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/08/12/the-durand-line-is-becoming-a-front-line-again-the-attack-that-restarts-the-cycle/