Along with India’s rapprochement with China, the New Delhi BRICS Summit showed that the group is no longer content to remain a platform for the Global South’s protest; it is beginning to build institutions, economic networks, and diplomatic alternatives of its own.

A summit held during a period of international turmoil

The 18th BRICS Summit, which took place in New Delhi from 12 to 13 September 2026, was probably the most important diplomatic event of the year apart from those held at the United Nations. It took place at a time when the international system is experiencing great stress: wars are altering the situation in the Middle East, the United States is employing tariffs and sanctions as tools of economic statecraft, global supply chains are being disrupted, and confidence in the current global governance mechanisms is falling.

BRICS now includes 11 members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Indonesia – together with 10 partner countries and about 30 with manifested interest to join the group. Since these countries have interests that often clash, the group comprises nations that are either strategic competitors or even parties to ongoing conflicts.

The task faced by India was therefore very great. It had to bring together the views of China and Russia with those of countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, while at the same time taking account of Iran and yet maintaining India’s wide-ranging relationships with the United States, Europe, Japan, and the other Western countries. This was indeed the main dilemma confronting New Delhi: could a broader coalition among the members of the Global South retain its collective diplomatic influence in the face of serious disagreements within the coalition itself?

The response from New Delhi is more interesting than a success or a failure; BRICS has not turned into a military or an ideological alliance but has taken a step further towards becoming an institutional and economic platform, as proposed by Xi Jinping, which can provide alternatives to those structures that have traditionally been dominated by the West.

India’s new stance: one of multi-alignment, with a preference for the BRICS and the Global South

The most notable aspect of India’s stance was not the fact that New Delhi had given up multi-alignment since it had not. Instead, the summit showed that India’s policy of multi-alignment is now being carried out within a more robust Global South framework, the BRICS.

For many years India’s policy has aimed at strengthening cooperation with Washington; taking part in the Quad, a military grouping to share information and contain China; keeping up its strategic partnership with Russia; developing ties with the Gulf; and handling its tough relationship with China. The issue is that the current level of geopolitical instability is making it harder to maintain this transactional approach. Prior to the summit, India’s experience had shown that partnerships with a number of smaller or middle-sized countries could not on their own make up for the significance of China, Russia, and the broader BRICS system.

This helps to account for the most surprising development between the two countries at the summit: the quick improvement in relations between Beijing and New Delhi.

There was no expectation that a warming of such speed would occur between Beijing and Delhi

The fact that Xi Jinping had returned to India after seven years and that he had a bilateral with Narendra Modi showed that both countries are coming to see the drawbacks of letting strategic competition turn into permanent confrontation. The two leaders agreed that differences should not escalate into disputes, reasserted the importance of peace along the border, and called for increased economic, commercial, and people-to-people engagement.

It by no means signifies that the rivalry between India and China has vanished, nor does it mean that India has suddenly accepted China’s regional ambitions. Rather, it seems that the geopolitical assessment has shifted: strategic competition need not involve sustained diplomatic hostilities. The BRICS group actually offers the kind of institutional setting in which the two countries can work together without feigning that their rivalry has ended.

It represents a significant development in India’s policy of aligning itself with multiple powers. Rather than being primarily concerned with striking a balance between two major powers, it is increasingly focused on leaving room for manoeuvre in a world that is itself becoming multipolar.

The message given by the leaders

The national priorities outlined in the speeches given in New Delhi were different, yet there was a surprisingly wide degree of agreement.

Modi portrayed BRICS as a means by which the Global South could become a rule-maker rather than a rule-taker. The key suggestion he made was of an institutional nature, namely a BRICS Continuity and Implementation Mechanism, which would be based on a Troika comprising the former, the current, and the next chairpersons. He also put forward a secure digital repository that would identify responsibilities, deadlines, and the implementation status. This addresses one of BRICS’ long-standing weaknesses, namely that declarations abound while implementation remains below expectations.

Xi Jinping put forward a more ambitious vision regarding practical economic integration, suggesting a BRICS Special Economic Zone partnership, a BRICS AI Open-Source Zone, and a BRICS Service Trade Forum for 2027. The point Beijing was making was that BRICS should go beyond political symbolism and establish economic, technological, and industrial networks capable of setting up its own development ecosystem.

With regard to the geopolitical transformation, Putin was even more specific, stating that the unipolar system was becoming a thing of the past and blaming countries that have been used to a “colonial mindset” for resisting the development of a multipolar world by means of sanctions, tariffs, interference and military force.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has urged BRICS to increase its political coordination, oppose unilateral sanctions, make greater use of its national currencies, and establish a permanent secretariat. For Tehran, BRICS is more than just an economic forum; it is a means of reducing its vulnerability to systems controlled by other powers.

Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, with an Africa agenda in mind, stressed more than anything else the need for development, increased investment, industrialisation and the reform of multilateral institutions, stating that the BRICS countries had to turn their political aspirations into real economic growth.

The UAE’s position was revealing because it challenged ideological interpretations of BRICS. Despite its close alignment with Washington and difficult relationship with Iran, Abu Dhabi supported a declaration calling for restraint and diplomacy. At the summit, the Iranian and Emirati leaders also agreed to move beyond their recent tensions.

The New Delhi Declaration: Cautious Language, Significant Implications

The New Delhi Declaration, although it contains 140 paragraphs, is more notable for the range of areas in which BRICS is currently coordinating than for its rhetorical confrontations.

With regard to the most sensitive geopolitical conflicts, its language was intentionally cautious so that the document could be approved by all members. On the issue of the Middle East, the members stated that they had “deep concern”, called for “maximum restraint” and stressed the importance of dialogue and diplomacy without naming the main belligerents. Furthermore, the declaration did not make a specific mention of the Russia-Ukraine war, a point which differed from earlier BRICS declarations.

It is clear that India, in cooperation with the UAE and the other members, aimed at arriving at a formulation that would preserve consensus rather than one that was more sharply critical of the United States or explicitly supportive of Iran. The internal inconsistency was evident in that while BRICS includes Iran, the UAE maintains close security relations with Washington. It was therefore a considerable diplomatic achievement to reach an agreement.

However, the declaration was by no means politically insignificant since it denounced unilateral coercive measures and sanctions not approved by the UN Security Council, criticised unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures, called for reform of the WTO, the UN, and demanded that emerging and developing economies should have greater representation in global institutions.

There were also more difficult stances. The document strongly supported the rights of the Palestinians, called for a ceasefire and for humanitarian access in Gaza, opposed forced displacement, and supported full UN membership for Palestine. It also denounced the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in April 2025 – a significant diplomatic achievement for India since China had backed a statement condemning the attack without the declaration specifically naming Pakistan.

The declaration’s apparent mildness, therefore, hides a more rigid institutional reality - that BRICS is learning how to disagree without falling apart.

The key points: What is BRICS turning into?

A key point is the idea of institutional continuity. Although Modi’s proposed Troika mechanism may seem technical, it deals with one of the basic weaknesses of BRICS since each presidency has generally led to a new agenda without having in place a strong enough mechanism to ensure that it is implemented. A continuity arrangement could thus slowly transform BRICS from a political forum based on summits into a more permanent system of governance.

The second point concerns the development of economic integration through networks rather than through a single currency. While the declaration promotes efforts towards interoperable cross-border payments, local-currency settlements and financial cooperation, it does not set up a BRICS currency or a common payment system. The earlier proposal by India for payment-system interoperability has not become a major political commitment.

The third point is China’s effort to give BRICS a much stronger productive and technological dimension, as shown by its proposal for a Special Economic Zone partnership, cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence, and a forum on services and trade, all of which point to an economic structure for BRICS that ties together manufacturing, technology, investment and trade. This brings a great advantage for a nation to be a BRICS member.

The fourth point is the ongoing development of an alternative development ecosystem, with the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank) being explicitly acknowledged as a strategic tool for development and modernisation in the Global South and a greater focus being placed on financing in local currencies and for infrastructure.

In the end, the summit affirms that BRICS is becoming part of the institutional framework of an emerging multipolar world.

It doesn’t follow that BRICS is already an alternative to the West in the sense of taking the place of NATO, the IMF, the World Bank, or the dollar-based financial system, since that would be too early. What it does offer instead is an alternative political arena: a setting in which emerging powers can coordinate without having to accept Western leadership as the normal basis for international cooperation – an alternative is gaining shape.

Which is why Putin’s statement concerning the resistance to multipolarity is important. The significant change is not merely that BRICS is growing in size; it is that the group has become more confident in expressing an alternative view of the international order - one grounded in sovereignty, development, institutional pluralism, and a stronger position for the Global South. The New Delhi Declaration clearly connects BRICS with multipolarity, the reform of the UN Security Council, and increased representation of developing countries in global governance.

It follows that the most accurate assessment is that BRICS has stopped being just a challenge to the West and is now acting as an alternative political and economic centre.

A major disadvantage is the fact that it is diverse: India and China are still competitors; Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have different security policies; Brazil is cautious because of the US’s new enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, and the various members also disagree about their relationship with the United States. Yet this diversity might in fact be important. BRICS is not evolving into a new bloc that replicates the Cold War pattern. Instead, it is trying to achieve something else: the formation of a coalition comprising different civilisations, political systems, and strategic interests that can work together without needing to be uniform.

The New Delhi summit did not establish a new world order, but it did provide a clearer sight of the order that is emerging.

Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/09/15/brics-in-new-delhi-from-global-south-platform-to-emerging-alternative/