Catalonia between Madrid and Brussels

The conflicts between Catalonia and the central government in Madrid are among the multiple issues in which the EU is directly involved since 1986, when Spain became a member-state of the European Community (EC). The fundamental issues in the relations between Barcelona and Madrid are:

1.      The conflict between Catalonia and Madrid was about taxes. Except for the Basque and Navarre regions, all the provinces pay their taxes to the central government of Spain. 33% of the collected tax was paid back to those provinces. However, Catalonia demanded that 50% of the collected tax be paid back. But the central government feared that if other autonomous regions also demanded 50% of taxes paid by them, the central government would go bankrupt.

2.     The second problem was about the “Catalan nation.” If Catalonia is accepted as “a nation”, as it is accepted in the Catalan Parliament, Spain feared demands from other autonomous regions. Catalonia demanded to be recognised as a nation, as they only had privileges; this created conflict with Madrid. The conflicts about regional-administrative taxing and being recognised (or not) as a nation became the most critical political problems between Barcelona and Madrid, for if Madrid recognised Catalonia as a nation, this region would acquire a full legal set of rights to proclaim its independence (which it did on October 27, 2017). 

3.     Another problem is language. The official language of Spain is Spanish (the language of Castilla), but every administrative region is allowed to speak its own language unless Spanish is not being taught. Catalonia does not implement the necessary three hours per week of Spanish language lessons at schools and, therefore, clashes with Madrid as the central government fears that Catalonia can totally lose its identity as part of Spain. That is why Madrid wants the Spanish language to be taught in schools in Catalonia officially for proper integration into Spanish society. However, Catalonia has a large residue of resentment and mistrust over certain features, including the language issue, symbolising the centralising and repressive tendencies of the Spanish central government.

Catalonia faces the problem of both globalisation and Spain’s membership in the EU in the process of seeking international recognition of its self-proclaimed independence. It is clear that in today’s globalised world order, no state or autonomous region can survive without relations with other states or international organisations. This problem shadows relations with the EU – a supranational organisation, which did not recognise Catalan independence declared in October 2017 but recognised the self-declared independence of Kosovo in February 2008. Regarding the Catalan declared independence, Brussels did not want to interfere in the internal matter of an independent and sovereign Spain, but directly and brutally violated Serbia’s Constitution when Kosovo Albanians proclaimed independence from Serbia.   

The EU, as the most unique supranational political structure in the world, is not willing to share power with a non-state entity. Catalonia, under the autonomous region conditions, does not have the right to influence the EU’s politics as the central government of Spain does. Thus, though Catalonia is a powerful region, it is not accepted as an influential figure in the EU. And the central government in Madrid does not accept Catalonia having the same rights as the Spanish administration in dealing with the EU.

Catalonia between independence and Spain

The possibility of a proclamation of Catalonia’s formal independence became the most problematic issue of the “Catalonian Question” for Madrid and for Brussels. It became clear over a long period of time, as happened in October 2017, that, in the event of a Catalan declaration of independence, the central Spanish authorities would not recognise it. But the problem was how the EU central bureaucratic apparatus (Council and Commission) would react to the Catalan right to national self-determination, including political independence: the same right which Brussels recognised in the cases of dissolutions of ex-Yugoslavia and the USSR, for instance.

The EU (at the time the European Community) formulated in 1991 four basic principles regarding the question of delimitation between Yugoslavia’s (six) federal republics and their unilateral declarations of political independence formally based on the right to national self-determination:

A.  Yugoslavia’s state (external) borders are unchangeable.

B.  Inter-republican borders can be changed only by collective agreement of the republics.

C.  Until the time when such agreement is reached, the former inter-republican borders are protected by international law (Uti possidetis iuris).

D. Forcible change of such borders does not produce a legal effect.

However, the border issue of the Catalan independence problem did not affect the “Catalonian Question” in Madrid or Brussels differently in comparison with the case of the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia. But, the nature of Brussels’ reaction to those two cases was quite different, as the EU’s administration did not imply a policy of non-interference in the inner affairs of Yugoslavia (in 1991-1992). In fact, the EU’s recognition of Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian anti-constitutional and unilateral separation basically fuelled the civil wars in the western territories of ex-Yugoslavia.

What Catalonia did in October 2017 was the same as what Yugoslav separatists did in 1991-1992 (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) and in 2008 (Kosovo). Spain is one of the five EU member-state which did not recognise Kosovo’s independence; as in this case, Madrid would have to do the same with Catalonian one. For Madrid, both these cases are illegal and unconstitutional.

Moreover, as Spain is an EU member state (since 1986), the EU’s recognition of the independence of Catalonia would dramatically deteriorate relations between the EU and Spain, that would not benefit Brussels. In addition, Brussels also fears that if Catalonia becomes independent, this would encourage other nationalistic movements within the EU countries (for example, Flemish, Scottish, Corsican, Basque, Lega Nord, Sardinian, etc.) and eventually disintegrate the EU. 

Catalonia has many privileges within Spain which the Catalans exercise for the good of Catalan society. However, a majority of Catalans struggle for political independence. The question is basically whether Catalans want to have politically recognised independence or to obtain more privileges from the central government in Madrid. Concerning this issue, there is a huge diversity inside Catalan society, which is divided between those who support independence and those who are satisfied with getting more privileges. The second group has four crucial arguments not to support independence but instead to struggle for higher autonomy:

1)     It is impossible to survive without having political and economic relations with other entities and without being recognised by the rest of the world. If Catalonia becomes independent, most of the states (especially the EU and NATO members) will not recognise it in order not to deteriorate their good and beneficial relations with Spain.

2)    Many Catalans prefer more privileges instead of independence, as in order to get independence Catalans have to use force like the Basque nation, which can provoke a civil war as in ex-Yugoslavia, with unpredictable consequences. Historically, Catalans prefer solving problems with Madrid with political methods, not by force. As traditionally they have acted politically, many Catalans are suspicious of the use of force. In essence, many Catalans believe that more privileges will be more beneficial for Catalonia, as Spain could impose an economic blockade if it forcefully declares independence and is recognised by some countries.

3)    The central government of Spain does not want to recognise the declared independence of Catalonia, and fears the “Yugoslav syndrome” – no independence without violence. According to international law and the United Nations’ Charter, if the existing status is changed by using force and, as a consequence, a new political situation is established, no State can recognise the independence of a new political unity; States which violate this are considered as transgressors. Hence, a majority of states would not recognise Catalan independence based on the use of force. This is an argument to stay in Spain as an autonomous region and to continue to struggle for its improvement.

4)    Catalans have a strong sense of regional-historical identity, but many Catalans do not want to lose their Iberian-Spanish identity and origin. The consciousness of belonging to a distinct community sharing the same historical background and the political desire for an autonomous region are desired simultaneously. Many Catalans admit having a dual identity and a desire to live with both of them: Spanish and Catalan. Admitting a Spanish identity also brings the demand for services like better education, healthcare, police services, and willingness to share economic and social developments, etc., from the central government, and because they believe that they have a significant impact on Spain’s domestic affairs, Catalans are pressing for more privileges in these areas.

The set of privileges given by Madrid to Catalonia’s autonomous region is sufficient to implement the Catalan affiliation to Spain. Catalans are very closely involved in decisions about Catalonia in terms of judgment, international agreements, teaching the Catalan language, preserving Catalan culture, and some important international issues.

The crucial question is: What more does Catalonia want from Madrid in lieu of independence? Basically, there are two cardinal requirements concerning the improvement of Catalonia’s autonomous status as compensation for her independence:

1)     Catalans want to be paid back more from the taxes given to Madrid, in comparison to other autonomous regions. The realisation of this requirement is, in fact, leading to the so-called “asymmetrical federation” which Slovenia and Croatia advocated in 1990 in their relations with the rest of Yugoslavia. However, the “asymmetrical federation” is unfair as it creates first- and second-class members of the federation, i.e., those with more and those with less privileges within the same political-economic system. Until April 2006, this Catalan demand was not met, but after the long negotiations between Madrid and Barcelona, Catalonia got the right to be paid back 50% of the collected taxes from its territory. Though the central government of Spain feared that all other autonomous regions could demand the same, Madrid recognised this right to Catalonia primarily because this decision was made according to the Constitution of Spain and advantaged position of Catalonia, which other autonomous regions could not object to. This was very beneficial for Catalonia, but because the Catalans had more demands, it was not enough to satisfy all Catalan wishes.

2)    Catalans wanted to be recognised as a nation. Winning 50% of the collected taxes, during negotiations, gave Catalans the feeling that the Generalitat is getting stronger and that Catalonia is gaining the features of a state within the state. Like taxing privilege, the recognition of Catalans as a nation was also made under the Constitution of Spain so that there were not many objections from other autonomous regions (which are not as powerful as Catalonia and cannot demand the same privileges as Catalonia enjoys). However, Catalans believe that Madrid could do more for Catalonia after the 2006 negotiations, and that is behind the endless political game between Madrid and Barcelona (with Catalan blackmailing Spain). Catalans want to have as much political power as Madrid has thus transform Spain into a dual state like Austria-Hungary from 1867 according to the Ausgleich. If this demand is met, Catalonia will be an independent political entity. However, that is a “red line” which Madrid cannot accept at any price, but if Spain recognises Catalonia and Catalans as a nation, it means that, theoretically, such an ethnic group has the right to live in its own independent state.

Conclusion

Catalonia, with the Barcelona hinterland, is a very important economic region for Spain, which Madrid cannot separate easily as it brings a huge amount of taxes to the centre. Catalans themselves have a strong sense of both Catalan and Spanish identities, followed by successful historical experience in coping with a central authority in Madrid. Therefore, since 1978, Catalonia has enjoyed a great degree of self-administration, being seen by many experts as a State within the State.

Although Catalonia had the right to a voice in issues related to Catalonia, it demanded more. At first, Madrid did not meet Catalonia’s demands, so problems grew. Another problem occurred between Catalans and the EU, as the EU never shared its centralised power with autonomous regions, though Catalans had huge economic resources. The most important reason for a strict pro-Madrid policy by Brussels is that the EU does not want to deteriorate good relations with Spain – a country that is much more important for both the EU and NATO in comparison to a separate Catalonia.

After a long period of clashes between Madrid and Brussels, a significant part of Catalan society understood that having more privileges can be more beneficial instead of formal political independence. They persuaded Madrid to grant more privileges in some important aspects of national life, but Catalonia demands more, as Barcelona wants to be as powerful as Madrid. Since Catalans are being recognised as a nation and are being paid back 50% of the taxes, other autonomous regions are not happy, but because all decisions about Catalan privileges between Madrid and Barcelona are justified by the Constitution, other autonomous regions are so far, staying silent.

However, the “Catalonian Question” within Spain, now an endless political game, requires the central government to be careful in order not to face serious problems with other autonomous regions. Finally, as the 2017 case clearly shows, Catalonia can get independence only if some global great power(s) directly supports Catalan secessionism.

Finally, at least from Madrid’s point of view, to solve the “Catalonian Question,” probably the optimal solution is that the historical lands of Castilla proclaim political independence from Catalonia. Castilla was one of the two founding independent states (kingdoms) of Spain in 1479.

(Concluded)