The King’s “Order” of September 12, 1944, and the Yugoslav Civil War
by Vladislav B Sotirovic on 29 Oct 2026 0 Comment

One of the most enduring Titoist mantras and clichés in the historiography concerning the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia during World War II is the alleged “Order” issued by King Peter II Karadordevic on September 12, 1944 - a narrative that persists in mass media and scholarly literature to this day. This order supposedly called upon all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (the three officially recognised “peoples” of Yugoslavia) to unite and join the so-called National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (Narodno Oslobodilacka Vojska Jugoslavije - NOVJ) - that is, the communist Partisans - under the command of Josip Broz Tito, and to continue the fight against the German occupiers under his banner.

 

The call, inter alia, - which was read out over Radio London - states:

 

“All those who rely on the enemy against their own people and their future, and who fail to heed this call, will not be able to escape the stigma of treason - neither in the eyes of the people nor before history. With this message, I firmly condemn the misuse of the King’s name and the authority of the Crown - a misuse employed to justify collaboration with the enemy and to sow discord among a people currently engaged in struggle during the gravest hour of their history - thereby serving only the interests of the enemy.”

 

It is important to highlight that, even eight decades after the end of the Second World War, that same war - in a global context - is still being waged in Serbia and among Serbs. The conflict is pursued through propaganda and political means (including falsification of historical sources), primarily via public media - most notably, online and electronic platforms. This has been brought to our attention once again - as it has been for many years - by commentaries in our press that continue to view our wartime and post-war history through a communist lens, characterised by an immense, retrospective optimism.

 

For instance, in a commentary on the text by Miomir Garašanin, we could read that members of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (JVuO) - “former Chetniks of Draža Mihailovic” - were transferred to Tito’s Yugoslav Army (JA, Partisan army) following the so-called “Order” allegedly issued by King Peter II Karadordevic of Yugoslavia on September 12, 1944. Little has been written about this still-unexplored episode from the end of the war; consequently, many aspects remain unaddressed and seem almost unbelievable.

 

However, until Yugoslav historians (those born after 1935, and not active participants in the war) shed light on this significant period of modern Serbian and Yugoslav history, that would shape the character of Serbian and ex-Yugoslav society for the next several decades (even an entire century) - we believe it is time that certain relevant facts, or at least some indications of the actual historical events, be presented to the broader public.

 

King Peter II was in exile in London following the occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, and never actually ruled Yugoslavia. It seems highly implausible that the nominal sovereign of the state - who also served as the Supreme Commander of the Official Yugoslav Army - would issue such an order. Members of the Official Yugoslav Army, especially General Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailovic, whom the King himself had appointed Chief of the Supreme Command of the Official Yugoslav Army - rightfully perceived this as a stab in the back, an act of high treason.

This raises a crucial question: what was the true nature of this so-called “Order”? Until historical documents are brought to light - and I do not mean those from Titoist archives - ordinary citizens of the former Yugoslavia are left to rely on various conjectures, some more plausible than others.

 

Two options are available to us:

 

1] British Prime Minister Winston Churchill exerted pressure on the Yugoslav King Peter II (a Serb) - either directly or through the government of Ivan Šubašic (a Croat) - to dismiss General Dragoljub Mihailovic (a Serb). This was done at the explicit demand of the Serbophobe Josip Broz Tito (whose origins trace back to Odessa or the Balkans). The latter – who proclaimed himself a “Marshal” in November 1943 – also demanded that the Official Yugoslav Army be disbanded as a military formation and its members (whom Titoist Agitprop had until then labelled “domestic traitors,” “collaborators with the occupiers,” “criminals,” etc.) join Tito’s so-called NOV (People’s Liberation Army). Churchill had already abandoned the Official Yugoslav Army in favour of the Partisans and Josip Broz, for reasons that were as logical as they were ruthless. We shall mention just two of these reasons here:

 

A)  The existence of two rival, antagonistic movements (Communist Partisans and Royalist patriots) meant that, instead of fighting the occupying forces, they engaged in mutual conflict and destruction. It was necessary to choose one of these two opposing forces as soon as possible and sacrifice the other for the sake of the Allies’ strategic objectives, both during and after the war. Tito (whose origins are extremely obscure) managed to convince the Allies, especially Churchill, that he was the stronger rival, and that the Official Yugoslav Army was weaker than his Partisans, and allegedly collaborated with the occupiers (which Tito’s Partisans did throughout the war: collaborating first with the Croat-Muslim Nazi Ustashi, and subsequently with the Italians and Germans, either directly or indirectly).

 

One key motive behind Churchill’s decision: It was clear to him that Tito and his Partisans were fighting primarily for power. For Tito, bypassing the occupiers or even collaborating directly with them, was a military-political strategy; this remained the case throughout the entire war. The Official Yugoslav Army fought to preserve the old (though reformed) order, with no intention of ruling the country after victory, nor participating in the distribution of power. Churchill was aware of what would happen once the Communists seized power in Yugoslavia; yet Churchill had post-war plans for Tito. Communist Yugoslavia was to play the key role of a “Trojan horse” within Stalin’s camp. Stalin realised this relatively quickly, and consequently expelled Tito and his party from the Cominform as early as June 1948.

 

The German Wehrmacht had the opposite logic. Its strategy was to maintain a balanced rivalry between the domestic armed forces so that they destroy each other and release the pressure on the occupying forces (e.g. “Battle of the Neretva” in 1943). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, this meant war operations that were not to the detriment of the Official Yugoslav Army, given that Josip Broz did work for the Wehrmacht with German and Ustashi weapons, but in Serbia until mid-1944 (where there were practically no partisan forces) the Wehrmacht waged an uncompromising fight against the forces of Draža Mihailovic because it could not rely on Tito.

 

B)  Ensuring the continued participation of the Red Army in military operations in Europe was crucial, as it was clear that Josip Broz Tito was Stalin’s proxy - and Stalin demanded that the Western Allies provide aid exclusively to Tito. Throughout the war, the Western Allies feared a repeat of the scenario from the First World War - the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918) - in which Lenin’s Soviet Russia withdrew from the conflict. This had, in fact, been the German plan; which is why Lenin (not ethnic Russian) was sent from Switzerland to Russia in a sealed train in 1917. Churchill opted to support Stalin’s agent in Yugoslavia.

One of the key decisions made during the—remarkably—unhindered (!) “Second Session” of Tito’s AVNOJ (the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) in the Bosnian town of Jajce—held on the night of November 28–29, 1943, within territory controlled by the Ustashi (following the shameful “March Negotiations” and the agreements signed with the Germans by Tito’s Partisans in that same year, 1943 regarding a joint struggle against the Official Yugoslav Army)—was the “prohibition” of the return of King Peter II and the Yugoslav royal dynasty to the country. This “prohibition” was, of course, legally void; it was merely one of the many bluffs that characterised the career of Josip Broz Tito right up until his (official) death in 1980. That death—along with his grandiose funeral—was itself a grand bluff, much like the decision to bestow upon him the rank of “Marshal” (a title granted to a man who had been a mere corporal in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War). In fact, he had been using the military rank of “Marshal” for months before the Second Session of AVNOJ—an event that was, in essence, a coup d’état carried out in the Bosnian town of Jajce.

 

2] Now, the main question arises: If the Yugoslav King truly issued the so-called “Order” - that is, a decision to effectively hand over his own army and the state’s military (of which he was Commander-in-Chief) to the very man who had “forbidden” his entry into his own country (Second Session of AVNOJ in Jajce, November 1943 - a country where he himself was born (unlike Tito, who was most likely born in Vienna or Odessa), and  considering that his grandfather, King Peter II (“Uncle Pera”), was the most beloved ruler of his time – how was he “persuaded” into this act, an act of high treason?

 

Members of the Official Yugoslav Army perceived this as a “stab in the back” by the sovereign they had sworn an oath of allegiance. The so-called “Order” granted authority to a man who had been tearing apart that very same country - whether during the First World War, while wearing the uniform of the Austro-Hungarian soldiery, or during the interwar period as a high-ranking official of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), and even during the general mobilisation of all military-able citizens in April 1941 when the Communists were sabotaging the country’s defense in accordance with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939.  (The cooperation agreement against the state of Yugoslavia signed between Croatian Ustashi and the Yugoslav Communists in 1932 has been written about extensively by many).

 

Let us also address this question with two hypothetical observations, given that, to date, no one has ever produced archival, documented proof of the King himself actually uttering this so-called “Order.” Let us recall that King Peter II Karadordevic was exploited with malicious intent by the British-backed putschists - led by Yugoslav General Dušan Simovic (Serb) - on March 27, 1941, when an audio “Proclamation” in support of the coup was broadcast on the radio, even though the King had never spoken those words. The same diplomatic circles that blatantly exploited the King in the spring of 1941 could just as easily have exploited him again in the autumn of 1944 with so-called “Order”:

 

A)    It is difficult to believe that coercion, physical or political, was involved, given that the King’s advisory circle included figures such as the intellectual and patriotic titan at Belgrade University, Professor Slobodan Jovanovic. The only possibility that comes to mind is deception. Possibly the King was offered a “deal”: disband your army, and you will be permitted to return to the country and “continue your reign.” For an honourable man, such a scenario is hard to credit; yet, every possibility must be considered with British diplomacy (which is, invariably, self-serving and perverse).

 

B)    A second possibility, highly probable, is the forced, fictitious participation of the nominal sovereign. During the military coup in Belgrade of March 27, 1941 (disastrous for Serbs, executed with skill by the British and the Croats - the underage Crown Prince was abruptly declared of age and proclaimed King; he supposedly read a statement over Radio Belgrade expressing his support for the coup and the putschists). It later emerged that the underage Crown Prince had nothing to do with it, and the proclamation was read by someone else. Could  something similar have occurred on September 12, 1944?

The reaction of the members of the Official Yugoslav Army to this orchestrated diplomatic-political ploy is best illustrated by a spontaneous folk verse:

“Uncle Draža, we swear to you,

that we shall not stray from your path”

Ironically, those very verses were sung by Broz’s supporters following the Cominform resolution of June 28, 1948 (on St. Vytus Day).

(Pure [communist] plagiarism).

 

The next question is: what portion of the Official Yugoslav Army actually obeyed the so-called “order” from the King and Supreme Commander to surrender to Tito’s Partisans; that is, accept a former Austro-Hungarian corporal from the First World War (much like Adolf Hitler) as new Supreme Commander? We know nothing about this and can only speculate. If this involved any significant number of troops, what became of them by the end of the war?

 

One possible scenario can be inferred from certain incidental episodes toward the end of the war in 1945. Specifically, when Tito set off to visit Moscow - following the formation of the “Srem Front,” an endeavour that proved tragic for the Serbs - he was apprehensive about the divisions from Serbia that were advancing toward Zagreb. (Tito issued an order to his Partisans not to destroy Catholic churches in Slavonia; yet, he never issued a similar directive to refrain from destroying Orthodox places of worship in Kosovo and Metohija or in central Serbia). He explicitly stated to the Chief of the General Staff, General Velimir Terzic, that the “Srem Front” was the front of King Peter II - and...

“When I return, I don’t want to see him anymore” [Milorad Ekmecic, From Slaughter to Plowing: A History of the Serbs in the Modern Era (1492–1992), third, supplemented edition, 2010, 494)].

 

How should this order from Broz be interpreted? In addition to the beardless youth of Serbia - who were sent to Tito’s “Srem Front” as “cannon fodder” to ensure corporal Broz’s seizure of power over all of Yugoslavia - former members of the Yugoslav Army were also “honoured” with such a role. Here is what that looked like, according to the testimony of Tito’s General, Ðoka Jovanic:

“The division included a Russian artillery regiment and a Katyusha battalion.

The commander of the Russian artillery regiment came to me and said:

‘Comrade General, I’ve been watching how you conduct your attacks - you are suffering heavy losses. That’s not how it should be done. You need to carry out an artillery preparation, bring in tanks, and only then...’

‘How are we supposed to bring in tanks and artillery when we don’t have any at all?’

‘You should wait for the leadership to provide them, and only then launch your attack.’

I replied: ‘Thank you very much; we will try to ensure we have fewer losses from now on.’“  [source: ????? ?????,  ???????? ???????? ???? ????????].

 

There is no doubt that former members of the Official Yugoslav Army (King Peter’s soldiers) who had joined the Partisans were “expended” in such battles. Tito’s commanders sent them and all other Serbs on the Srem Front,” to certain death. They continued the Croatian policy of killing Serbs in the death camp of Jasenovac, now on the right bank of the Drina River.

 

The “Srem Front” was held not only by the Wehrmacht but also by the Croatian Ustashi, who seized this opportunity to implement their policy of a “Final Solution to the Serbian Question” against Serbs from Serbia proper as well. More than 30,000 fighters fell on each side. The front was, in fact, breached by Red Army units - just as they had previously captured Belgrade (only to hand it over to the Serbophobe Broz, allowing him to do whatever he pleased with the local population there and throughout Serbia). In this way, the 1932 agreement between the Communists and the Ustashi regarding bilateral cooperation finally reached its conclusion. The price paid consisted of the Serbian people and King Peter II Karadordevic.

 

Finally, it is necessary to highlight the fundamental reason why, in September 1944, Churchill opted to support Broz’s Partisans at the expense of the King’s Ravna Gora forces (the Chetniks, Official Yugoslav Army). In Churchill’s view, the Serbs could not be allowed to emerge victorious at the end of the war; the Croats had to prevail. He was aware that the collapse of Nazi Germany would also mean the demise of the Ustashi movement and its Independent State of Croatia (NDH); Broz’s Partisans served as a fallback mechanism for the realisation of Croatian national objectives.

 

Thus, Broz and Churchill found themselves aligned in an anti-Serbian pact during their bilateral meeting in Naples - which took place following the German military operation in Bosnia (the “Raid on Drvar” on May 25, 1944, that was aimed at capturing Churchill’s son, Randolph, who was then present at Broz’s headquarters - rather than Tito himself). The King’s so-called “Order” of September 12, 1944, served merely as the epilogue to this policy; the collateral damage included General Mihailovic’s Ravna Gora forces and Serbia as a whole - a nation that has yet to recover from that devastation to this day.

 

[The text of the speech by King Peter II Karadordevic (directed against himself), delivered on September 12, 1944, was published in the Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, No. 20, dated October 25, 1944]

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