A series of international events held from March to early April this year by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi once again underscores the particular importance New Delhi places on controlling the situation in the Indian Ocean Region.

The issue of maintaining control in the Indian Ocean area, as well as the territories of the island and bordering coastal states located there - which together form the geopolitical category known as the “Indian Ocean Region” (IOR) - has always become especially acute during periods of increased global turbulence. This was the case, for instance, during World War II, when the Imperial Japanese Navy, following initial victories over its opponents in the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, surged into the Indian Ocean in April 1942.

Today, in the midst of yet another flare-up of the “Great Game” that began in the second half of the last decade, there is growing military activity in the IOR from both of its main players - namely, the United States and the People’s Republic of China. A great deal has been written on this topic in recent years, with varying levels of analytical depth and objectivity. The narrative frequently centers on the “expansion of Chinese military presence” as the primary motivator behind everything happening in the region.

It is worth noting, therefore, that back in 2018, the former “Pacific Command” - the largest within the U.S. armed forces - was renamed the “Indo-Pacific Command,” and is now tasked, in coordination with “Central Command,” with ensuring American interests in the Indian Ocean Region as well. Let us once again point out some of the puffed-up posturing in this context by certain European actors as well.

However, within the IOR itself, a new and increasingly significant participant in global processes is emerging: the Republic of India. Its leadership clearly does not intend to passively observe the various manoeuvres of the aforementioned global powers, nor those of other adventurers seeking trouble. To illustrate, consider a recent statement by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, who emphasized the strength of the Indian Navy, already capable, as he put it, of countering “any others” possessing naval forces in the Indian Ocean. It is clear who is being implied here.

Moreover, the “someone” in question is identified with increasing directness by the generals subordinate to Singh whenever the discussion turns to the comprehensive growth of the People’s Liberation Army or the demonstrative flights of the Chinese fifth (possibly even sixth) generation fighter, the J-36.

The very fact that China is now capable of projecting power into the IOR makes it evident that the realization of the seemingly odd meme “The Indian Ocean must be Indian” is still far from being achieved. But in New Delhi, this is precisely how the future of the region is envisioned. To this end, not only military buildup is being intensified, but also the political and diplomatic efforts to position the country on the international stage - particularly, of course, within the IOR. The latest foreign visits by Prime Minister Modi are a clear testament to this.

Modi’s Visits to Sri Lanka and Mauritius, and His First Contact with the Head of Bangladesh’s New Government

The topic of the growing India-China rivalry for influence over the island and coastal states of the IOR is regularly discussed in NVO (Independent Military Review). While these countries tend to profess a more or less neutral stance, in practice, each of them reveals - whether subtly or more overtly - a preference for either India or China.

Incidentally, a similar pattern is observed in the neighbouring region of Southeast Asia. Although its nations are supposed to form a united front through the regional ASEAN Association, in reality, they position themselves differently with respect to the main players vying for influence - chiefly China and the United States. Meanwhile, the presence of Japan and India is becoming increasingly noticeable in Southeast Asia as well.

Furthermore, in both Southeast Asia and the IOR, the behaviour of any given “object” of heightened attention from the major powers is not fixed and often changes radically when a new political grouping takes power in that country - most commonly as a result of elections. In the autumn of 2023, such a shift toward China occurred in the Maldives.

A year later, a similar turn, this time in India’s favour, took place in Sri Lanka. During a visit to New Delhi in late December last year, newly elected Sri Lankan President A.K. Dissanayake stated in talks with Prime Minister Modi that he would not allow his country to be used as a source of threats to India. The same words were repeated three months later (in early April this year), when Dissanayake received Modi on a state visit to Sri Lanka. Several bilateral agreements were signed during their talks, including ones in the field of defense.

It’s worth noting that for India, maintaining strong relations with Sri Lanka carries an important domestic dimension due to the ethnic ties between the Tamil populations in India’s southern state of Tamil Nadu and the northern provinces of Sri Lanka. Any unrest on one side of the 50-kilometer strait separating the two cannot help but affect the other. One particularly serious challenge to Indo-Sri Lankan relations was the 25-year civil war in northern Sri Lanka, which only ended in 2009.

These recent developments from Modi’s Sri Lanka visit represent the second significant foreign policy achievement for India in recent months. A month earlier, equally important agreements were signed by Modi during his visit to the Republic of Mauritius, an island nation located about 1,500 kilometers southeast of the African continent. Nearly half its population is of Indian descent, which largely explains the Mauritian leadership’s favourable attitude toward India. One of the documents signed there was a “Security Pact” which, reportedly, covers the entire Indian Ocean basin.

Also noteworthy was Modi’s first contact with the head of Bangladesh’s “transitional government,” M. Yunus, who came to power following the well-known events of August last year. Sheikh Hasina, who had previously led the Bangladeshi government for 15 uninterrupted years since 2009, was forced to seek refuge in India. Since then, the new government’s demand for her extradition to stand trial has been a major obstacle to restoring the now severely deteriorated bilateral relations.

In India, it is believed that an equally (if not more) significant negative factor was what New Delhi sees as a “shift toward China” in the previously more or less neutral foreign policy course of Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the current Bangladeshi leadership refers to Sheikh Hasina as an “Indian puppet” - a characterization that, in the author’s view, is a clear exaggeration. She skilfully balanced the forces at play between India and China, and did so in a way that benefited Bangladesh. It is beyond doubt that Sheikh Hasina played a crucial role in the country’s rapid economic progress in the 2000s.

This “Modi–Yunus” contact took place in early April in Bangkok, on the sidelines of another meeting of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a forum that includes seven countries, most of which (except for Nepal and Bhutan) border the Bay of Bengal. The content and outcomes of the 40-minute meeting are presented differently by the two sides. Most likely, the expert opinion is correct that the meeting can only be considered positive if it results in at least a “stabilization of relations” between India and Bangladesh.

Finally, it is worth noting that the recent activities of Modi’s government in the IOR underscore the growing importance it attaches to developments in the region - a region where India itself is located.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/04/18/the-indian-ocean-region-a-zone-of-special-interest-for-new-delhi/