Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Xi Jinping meet for the first time since the India–China border conflict.

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s first official visit to Beijing since the border clashes with China in May 2020, and his talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, underscore the serious intent of both leading Global South powers to resolve ongoing bilateral issues - including territorial disputes - and to establish a new, pragmatic framework for their relationship.

Jaishankar’s visit coincided with the July 15 meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Council of Foreign Ministers in China. That same day, he and the other SCO ministers were received by President Xi Jinping, to whom he conveyed the steps India is taking to enhance trust and mutual understanding between the two countries.

Positive momentum in the relationship continues

This trip followed the agreements reached during the meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan in October 2024. The positive momentum generated by that high-level contact - the first in years - provided a constructive backdrop for Jaishankar’s talks with Chinese Vice President Han Zheng and Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

These Beijing discussions were preceded by meetings between high-level representatives from both countries on border and other sensitive issues, including Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. Through these talks, the two sides agreed to reduce tensions, disengage and withdraw forces from disputed areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) - the de facto boundary between the two nations. Additional steps were also outlined to eliminate barriers to normalizing and expanding cooperation across different spheres.

Tibet - the recurring point of friction?

Though it did not derail the foreign ministers’ talks, controversy surrounding the Dalai Lama’s succession plans - announced just prior to the visit - complicated the diplomatic atmosphere. During celebrations for his 90th birthday in India on July 2, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader reaffirmed that his reincarnation would be determined solely by the Ganden Phodrang institution he established. China strongly opposes this position and insists on its right to approve the Dalai Lama’s successor, citing “historical precedent.”

The Dalai Lama, however, remains firm in his view that the question of succession is an internal matter for Tibetans, to be resolved according to procedures he himself has outlined. India, for its part, finds itself in a delicate position. While maintaining formal neutrality on the issue, New Delhi also shows respect for the Dalai Lama and the traditions of Tibetan Buddhism. It is clear that the reincarnation dispute transcends religious boundaries and could have a negative impact on interstate relations. Beijing expressed its displeasure over Prime Minister Modi’s recent birthday greetings to the Dalai Lama, viewing the gesture as interference in Tibet’s internal affairs and, by extension, in China’s domestic politics.

China remains deeply dissatisfied with India’s 1959 decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama and around 70,000 Tibetan refugees, who subsequently established a “government-in-exile” in Himachal Pradesh. These long-standing irritants continue to cast a shadow over relations and force New Delhi to tread carefully. At the same time, India does not give in to Chinese pressure. Indian authorities, however, have occasionally reined in the exiled leader when his statements or actions threatened to harm relations with Beijing.

The border issue - unresolved, yet manageable

However, this issue is not the central one in the relationship between these two, in effect, global powers, although it remains a constant source of irritation. Far more serious is the long-standing territorial dispute over the nearly 60,000 square kilometers in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, as well as a remote, mountainous desert region in Aksai Chin, located in the northern part of Indian-administered Kashmir. During earlier border conflicts, China seized part of Arunachal Pradesh in 1959, and in 1962 took control of 38,000 square kilometers in Aksai Chin - now part of India’s union territory of Ladakh.

In both areas, there is no formally demarcated border: instead, the two countries are separated by Lines of Actual Control. Tensions are higher in the north, particularly in the high-altitude border area of Ladakh. The most recent serious escalation occurred in the summer of 2020, when military clashes broke out between the two sides. Subsequently, the parties managed to agree on the withdrawal of troops and rules for patrolling along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh - though a degree of tension still persists.

Overall, both sides have shown a willingness to take steps to stabilize the situation along disputed areas in the north and northeast. Relevant meetings continue to take place. However, neither India nor China is prepared to make any territorial concessions, which carries the risk of new confrontations. At this stage, the acute phase of tensions along the LAC has been defused, but the issue remains central in high-level bilateral discussions.

The Pakistan factor

Another source of concern for New Delhi is China’s growing cooperation with India’s long-standing adversary - Pakistan - particularly in the military and defense spheres. Beijing’s tacit solidarity with Islamabad following a recent Islamist terrorist attack in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir has also done little to improve the bilateral climate.

Nonetheless, the modest warming in political dialogue has been accompanied by an increase in bilateral trade, which now stands at approximately $130 billion - with Chinese exports exceeding $120 billion. As a result, China has overtaken the United States to become India’s largest trading partner. Connections in other areas are gradually being restored as well. To facilitate humanitarian and cultural exchanges, the ministers agreed, among other things, to resume direct air travel between the two countries.

At the same time, a full restoration of trust and mutual understanding between these two, in many ways competing, powers is still a long way off. Both sides will need to make significant progress before the declared partnership can become a reality. In this context, the Indian foreign minister’s visit to China is undoubtedly of major importance. As for Russia, we are firmly committed to the full normalization of relations and rapprochement between India and China - our two most important strategic partners - including within such influential international institutions as BRICS and the SCO.

Anvar Azimov, diplomat and political scientist, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, PhD in History, Senior Researcher at the Eurasian Educational Institute of MGIMO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/07/17/the-complex-relationship-between-india-and-china/