Global Governance and Institutional Competition

As institutional trust erodes in the West, BRICS is betting that credibility and representativeness, not just financial weight, will shape the future of global governance. In this article, I explore the vision laid out in the summit’s final declaration, alongside perspectives and questions raised by experts from across the world.

BRICS Signals New Phase in Global Governance Debate

At its 2025 Rio Summit, BRICS doubled down on its ambition to reshape the architecture of global governance. The final summit declaration stresses the group’s commitment to a “more democratic, representative, and equitable international order,” highlighting long-standing frustrations with Western-led institutions. The BRICS bloc reaffirms support for UN reform, particularly expanding the Security Council to better reflect today’s geopolitical realities - including stronger representation for developing nations.

The text positions BRICS as both a reformer and an alternative to existing global institutions. Emphasis on strengthening BRICS’s own bodies - notably the New Development Bank (NDB) and BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement. These mechanisms are not framed as parallel systems but as complementary instruments aiming to “reinforce South-South cooperation” and “promote financial stability.”

Importantly, the bloc supports a multipolar world where “no one country or group dominates.” While affirming principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, BRICS challenges the legitimacy of sanctions not approved by the UN Security Council. With this, the group is carving out a narrative that mixes institutional competition with legitimacy claims, asserting that a post-Western order must reflect the needs and voices of the Global South.

Reforming the International Order: Constructive Force or Counterbalance?

The question whether BRICS functions as a constructive force reshaping global governance or merely a counterbalance to existing powers reveals fundamental disagreements among the experts consulted about the bloc’s ultimate purpose. Pakistani analyst Naik Wazir captures this duality: “BRICS acts as a counterbalance to Western-led institutions by offering alternatives. BRICS aims to engage constructively, as it was created not to oppose or antagonize others but to offer an alternative perspective in world affairs.”

From India, Soumyajit Gupta presents BRICS institutions as “more mediators of existing structures than genuine competitors,” hampered by “under-utilization, internal heterogeneity, and tepid follow-through.” His analysis of the New Development Bank (NDB) versus traditional institutions reveals significant limitations: while the World Bank provides $300 billion in annual lending, “the NDB has approved fewer than 70 projects totalling ~$25 billion to date, revealing institutional inertia and conservative risk appetites.”

Russian expert Andrey Kortunov offers a more measured assessment, arguing that BRICS “can promote trade and investments among its members” and “could help to shape common non-Western approaches to global problems.” He notes that “over last ten years, the intra-BRICS trade grew on average by 10.7% annually, while the overall global trade grew by only 3% per year,” suggesting tangible economic benefits despite institutional limitations.

De-dollarization: Rhetoric Versus Reality

The drive toward financial autonomy represents perhaps BRICS’ most ambitious governance challenge. Moroccan analyst Yassine El Bouchikhi emphasizes that “as long as the BRICS does not attack the heart of the problem, which is the international financial system via the hegemony of the dollar and its weaponization, these efforts will not be of critical importance in changing the balance of power.”

Turkish analyst Celal Çetin provides historical context, noting that the USSR’s collapse began when “Nixon suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold in the 1970s, which gave it the freedom to print unlimited dollars and make any competition to its system impossible.” This analysis suggests BRICS faces fundamental structural challenges in creating genuine alternatives to dollar-dominated systems.

Russian expert Georgy Toloraya acknowledges these limitations, noting that “progress towards a common currency or settlement unit for BRICS, which Russia is interested in and has been promoting, is currently stalled due to the skeptical attitudes of most BRICS countries, which are tightly bound to the dollar system.” The practical challenges of de-dollarization reflect deeper questions about BRICS members’ willingness to sacrifice immediate economic interests for long-term strategic goals.

Institutional Innovation and Global Competition

Despite limitations, BRICS has achieved notable institutional innovations. The establishment of the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement represents concrete alternatives to Bretton Woods institutions, even if their impact remains limited. Brazilian expert Claudya Piazera sees BRICS as offering “a more participatory model in global governance, one that rejects a Western-centric approach and promotes pluralism.”

From Iran, political researcher Amir Maghdoor Mashhood presents a more skeptical view, describing BRICS as “less as a geopolitical alliance and more as a forum for states seeking economic leverage and opportunities.” He argues that “what unites these countries is economic interest, not a coherent worldview,” limiting BRICS’ capacity to challenge existing governance structures fundamentally.

The UAE’s Dr. Alexander offers a nuanced perspective, noting that BRICS “has highlighted the limitations and inequities of existing institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and UN Security Council, especially in giving voice to emerging and developing nations.” However, he emphasizes that this duality, constructive engagement combined with institutional competition, allows countries like the UAE to “engage without becoming trapped in binary rivalries.”

UN Reform and Security Council Dynamics

BRICS’ approach to UN Security Council reform reveals both the bloc’s ambitions and its internal contradictions. Russian expert Toloraya notes that “essentially, all BRICS member states agree that the current UN structure (especially the Security Council’s composition) is outdated, reflecting only the realities of 1945 rather than those of the modern world.”

However, achieving consensus on specific reforms proves challenging. Indian analysts highlight that while “the call for UN Security Council reform, with clear backing of Brazil and India by China and Russia, reflects a challenge to existing global power structures,” China’s actual support remains questionable. As Gupta observes, “China supports reform but implicitly sabotages specific initiatives, as it does not want to share power with new permanent member states (especially with India).”

The African dimension adds further complexity. The African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus demands “at least two permanent seats with veto power and five non-permanent seats on an enlarged Security Council,” but current permanent members, including BRICS countries, find this approach impractical. This reveals fundamental tensions between BRICS’ rhetoric of Global South representation and members’ national interests.

Climate and Technology Governance

BRICS’ approach to emerging governance challenges in climate and technology reveals both innovation potential and coordination difficulties. The Rio summit’s launch of the BRICS Leaders’ Statement on Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence represents a significant attempt to establish “independent norms for emerging technologies and sustainable finance.”

However, internal disagreements persist. Russian expert Toloraya notes tensions between “the openness of the internet (India) and its control (China, Russia)” alongside “the technological lag of Africa and Latin America.” These differences reflect broader challenges in developing coherent BRICS positions on cutting-edge governance issues.

On climate governance, Brazilian leadership through COP30 hosting provides opportunities for BRICS coordination, but national interests diverge significantly. Toloraya observes that “Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China will insist on a gradual phasing out of oil and gas rather than strict bans,” while other members may push for more aggressive climate action.

In sum, BRICS still has a long road ahead to shape global governance in line with Global South aspirations. As Kenyan expert Jasleen Gill aptly notes, while BRICS presents itself as a force for reform, it must first confront its own internal asymmetries.

Concluded

Ricardo Martins ?PhD in Sociology, specializing in International Relations and Geopolitics. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/07/26/after-the-brics-summit-in-rio-global-governance-and-institutional-competition-part-2/