Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin – More than Just a Sideline Meeting

The parade at which the leaders of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stood hand in hand would be incomplete without a separate mention of the talks between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un. These lasted two and a half hours and in format resembled a summit-level meeting far more than the usual encounters of heads of state on the sidelines of a multilateral event.

On the Meeting of the Leaders of Russia and the DPRK

After the parade, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un entered the car of the President of the Russian Federation and set off for negotiations at the state residence of Diaoyutai, where the Russian president was staying during his visit to Beijing. The talks were attended by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov, Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Alexander Kozlov, and the Russian president’s aide on foreign policy, Yuri Ushakov.

According to the Kremlin’s website, Vladimir Putin remarked that “in recent times relations between our countries have acquired a special, trusting and friendly nature, an allied character. At your initiative, as is well known, your special units took part in the liberation of the Kursk region, fought courageously and heroically, and we will never forget the sacrifices made by your armed forces and the families of your servicemen.”

Thanking, on behalf of the Russian people, the people of the DPRK for “taking part in the joint struggle against contemporary neo-Nazism,” Putin expressed his satisfaction that “we now have the opportunity to talk about our bilateral relations, in every dimension, in every area.”

Kim Jong Un likewise expressed his delight at the meeting, noting that “since the signing of our interstate treaty last June, relations between our countries have been developing in every aspect,” and voiced particular gratitude to the President of the Russian Federation for the fact that “Comrade Putin, you have on several occasions - including here - given high praise to the feat of our soldiers.”

The DPRK leader emphasized that “if there is anything with which we can help Russia, we will most certainly do it, and we will regard this as a fraternal duty; we will do everything possible to help Russia.” The DPRK, he stressed, would continue to give full support to the struggle of the Russian government, army, and people in defense of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security interests of the state, and would remain unwaveringly committed to the fulfilment of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

This dialogue illuminated a very important point. In the West, the participation of North Korean troops in the Special Military Operation is usually presented as the result of a request from the Russian leadership: allegedly, unable to accomplish the military task on its own, Moscow turned to Pyongyang for help, compensating it with economic aid and military technology. Now, however, it becomes clear that the initiative did not come from Vladimir Putin but from Kim Jong Un, and moreover that the assistance was described as a fraternal duty in response to the liberation of Korea by the Soviet army in 1945.

The official negotiations at the state residence of Diaoyutai lasted more than an hour and a half; afterward, the leaders continued their conversation. The essence of their one-on-one discussions, which lasted about an hour, remained hidden behind the standard formulations that they had “discussed in detail the long-term plans for cooperation between the DPRK and the Russian Federation and once again confirmed their firm resolve to continue developing bilateral relations at a high level.” Yet it is obvious that Putin and Kim were “synchronizing their watches,” exchanging views on international and regional issues. Vladimir Putin once again invited the leader of the DPRK to visit Russia. The invitation was accepted.

The Meeting of the Leaders in the Context of Bilateral Relations

It must be noted that the visit was not a one-off event. On Liberation Day, 15 August, Pyongyang was visited by a large delegation headed by the Speaker of the State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, which included scholars and cultural figures who took part in a joint concert. Ministerial-level delegations arrive almost weekly.

The exchange of messages has also not ceased. On 4 September Vladimir Putin sent Kim Jong Un a congratulatory telegram on the occasion of the Day of the Founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In it, he expressed his confidence that “through joint efforts we will ensure the further strengthening of the comprehensive strategic partnership that unites our states. This fully corresponds to the interests of the friendly peoples of Russia and the DPRK, and is in line with the goal of ensuring security and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole.”

Cooperation is expanding in economic, humanitarian, and military fields – 6,000 engineers and military builders have already begun work in the Kursk region.

Discussion of the Meeting in the Republic of Korea

Within South Korea’s expert community, the meeting provoked a wave of commentary, some of which seemed of particular interest to the author for the questions they raised.

First, in the South they are trying to understand how long the “honeymoon of Moscow and Pyongyang” will last. There is an opinion that once the Special Military Operation ends, Moscow’s attention may shift back to the West, forcing Kim once again to turn to China as the principal provider of support for North Korea. But this is not so – the conclusion of the Special Military Operation on Russian terms would trigger a new round of sanctions against both Moscow and Pyongyang, keeping them “in the same trench.”

Second, analysts speculate on how this period will affect inter-Korean relations. Some believe that Russia might act as a mediator between Pyongyang and Seoul, but the more widespread view is that the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the DPRK will shape Moscow’s relations with Seoul, making talk of an equidistant policy no longer possible. Article Five of the treaty imposes restrictions on contact with hostile states, and according to the DPRK’s narrative, the Republic of Korea has now been declared the main enemy.

Even so, some assume that Moscow will support dialogue between the DPRK and the United States. The former director of the Diplomatic Academy of the Republic of Korea, Hong Hyun-Ik, even suggests the possibility of a meeting between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump in Vladivostok. Yet, as usual, the central question is overlooked: “What could Trump possibly offer Kim to persuade him to agree to such a meeting, and what could the United States give the North that Russia could not?”

Andrew Yeo, Chair of the South Korea Foundation in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, also observes that “Kim’s meetings with Putin and Xi Jinping provide him with greater international legitimacy and strengthen his position, especially if he decides to meet Trump”: any Trump-Kim deal would require support from both Beijing and Moscow.

Third, it is noted that while Moscow and Pyongyang are deepening their relations, in Seoul there appears to be no intention to engage with Moscow beyond the bare minimum. Although the rise to power of Lee Jae-myung was accompanied by certain expectations, there has been no telephone conversation between the leaders, no special envoy has been dispatched, and even the nomination of a new South Korean ambassador to Russia remains unknown. At this pace, the respondents consulted by the author worry that President Lee may miss the opportunity to restore relations with Russia, or even fail to maintain them at their current level.

To conclude. As can be observed, the meeting between Putin and Kim lasted longer than the one between Kim and Xi, reflecting the current level of interaction between the two states. And although it did not result in new statements or declarations, it consolidated the breakthrough already achieved in their bilateral relations.

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/09/11/the-korean-dimension-of-events-in-china-september-2025-part-two-kim-jong-un-and-vladimir-putin-more-than-just-a-sideline-meeting/