[Three questions raised by a media scribe on September 29]

Q: Is the US working against Indian interests?

This question cannot be answered in the binary of yes or no. It has to be answered in the backdrop of the robust defence partnership that has grown during the last two decades between India and the US. Both the countries have signed several key agreements that enhance military cooperation, interoperability and strategic alignment between them. These include

LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) allowing both countries to use each other’s military facilities for replenishment, enhancing operational reach and logistics support.

COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) signed in 2018, facilitates secure communications between U.S. and Indian military systems, enabling interoperability during joint operations.

BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) signed in 2020, allows sharing of geospatial intelligence and satellite data for improved targeting and navigation.

ISA (Industrial Security Agreement) signed in 2019, enables the transfer of classified technology and information to Indian private defence firms, boosting co-development and co-production.

Last year, India signed SOSA (Security of Supply Arrangement), which ensures priority access to defence goods and services during emergencies, strengthening supply chain resilience. The two countries have signed an MoU on Liaison Officers that enable deployment of Indian officers to U.S. commands (starting with U.S. Special Operations Command), improving coordination and information sharing. They have also signed a 10-Year Defence Framework for long-term roadmap for defence cooperation, focusing on joint production, technology transfer, and strategic alignment.

The Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance (ASIA) is a collaborative initiative for Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA), reflecting growing interest in maritime security. Besides these, India and US cooperation in space have moved beyond astronaut training and commercial transactions.

A joint Earth-observing satellite using dual frequency synthetic aperture radar is scheduled for launch from India’s Satish Dhawan Space Center under the NASA-ISRO NISAR agreement.

India is also a member of the Quad - quadrilateral framework - consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US which came into existence in the wake of COVID pandemic, to enhance supply chain cooperation following Chinese domination of chip and rare earths industries.

These agreements have enabled India to acquire from the US MH-60R Seahawks, Apache helicopters and P-81 maritime patrol aircraft, enhancing India’s airlift, logistics and surveillance capacities. India’s maritime surveillance and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has now become reality. GE has become the supplier for engines for LCA Tejas light combat aircraft. Co-production deals are underway for Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stryker combat vehicles. In fact, India is the first non-treaty partner to whom the US has offered the Sea Guardian UAS under the Missile Technology Control. 

This is perhaps the reason why PM Narendra Modi reacts after a lot of deliberation to POTUS Donald Trump’s provocative comments and moves affecting good relations with India. These include slapping 50+50% tariff for energy trade with Russia and increasing visa fee to $100,000 and cutting down on visas for foreign students.

PM Modi probably understands Trump’s guiding lights better than others. Trump is guided by “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) - a nationalist framework that emphasizes American sovereignty, economic self-interest, and a rejection of globalist “entanglements”. His foreign policy, which is marked by transactionalism, unilateralism and a focus on domestic revival over international commitments. As a result, promoting domestic manufacturing and imposing tariffs to protect American industries has been adopted as his state policy.

He has reduced the US involvement in multilateral organisations like the UN, WHO and even NATO. He advocates military deterrence while avoiding foreign wars. Trump also emphasises traditional values and national pride as fundamental to his policy pronouncements. As a result, the Trump-Vance Doctrine seeks to avoid open ended military commitments forcing its foreign allies to spend more on defence. He treats foreign relations as deals rather than diplomatic initiatives. As a result short term gains and personal leverage have replaced his moves even with long-term allies like Japan and NATO members.

Trump has adopted tariff driven trade policy, imposing sweeping tariffs on imports to rebalance trade deficits and revive American industry. This has not only affected US relations with allies but has skewed global supply chains. As a commentator says in the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Trump’s foreign policy increasingly centers around his own image, shifting from MAGA to MTGA (Make Trump Great Again) to assert his dominant personality replacing ideology driven US foreign policy doctrines like Bush’s neo-conservatism or Obama’s multilateralism. His repeated claims of mediating in the recent Op Sindoor conflict between India and Pakistan despite India’s stout denial, bringing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Cambodia and Thailand also vouch for his quest for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Q: “Is Washington seeking to contain India strategically? What do you make of the developments in the region and beyond?”

These questions have to be examined in Trump’s ideological backdrop discussed earlier. In my view, there are three prongs to Trump’s US policy approach to India:

a) Use of US trade talks with India as a bargaining chip to compel India to whittle down its close relations with Russia and eliminate threat posed to American unilateralism by multilateral alliances like BRICS.

b) Restrict India’s ambitions to South and Central Asia by using Deep State to trigger anti-India sentiments in its neighbourhood. I see a pattern in the popular uprisings noticed particularly in Bangladesh and Nepal, though in Sri Lanka it was different. Reviving US-Pakistan strategic relations is also part of this strategy apart from US ambitions to gain control over Afghanistan and Iran (as also the abolishing US’ waiver given to India over Chabahar port from US sanctions slapped on Iran).

How should India perceive growing U.S.-Pakistan bonhomie and perceived U.S. attempts to increase foothold in South Asia, including in Afghanistan? Is that something that New Delhi should be concerned about?

India should be wary of developments in US-Pakistan bonhomie. Perhaps, time for India to read the red lines on Pakistan in every foreign policy palaver with the US. I see the US initiative in Pakistan as more than keeping India engaged. It will help America tackle Iran (as the possibility of Iran-Russia-China triumvirate emerging stronger cannot be ruled out). As a part of it, the US probably hopes to regain control of Bagram airbase as a trade-off for helping Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to regain international recognition. It will also cut down India’s independent quest to repair relations with the Afghan Taliban. I see the recent strategic cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as part of the US initiative to help the US’ anti-Iran strategy.  

India should adopt a policy not subject to the vagaries of Trump’s US policy. India should not hyphenate its approach to the US to the latter’s Pakistan policy. One can expect the scaling down of US rhetoric on India as concessions are given to US trade in the talks. Already, $100,000-visa is a little watered down by the US. It has announced that it is not for renewals. We can expect conditions for student visas also to be watered down as universities are clamouring. It is good to remember under POTUS Trump foreign policy is irrevocably linked to making “deals”.

Courtesy Col R Hariharan, VSM, a retired MI specialist on South Asia and terrorism. He served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies.