The war brewing along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border is not just about militants or misplaced fences. It is a reckoning showing the collapse of Pakistan’s decades-old illusion that Kabul could be controlled, that jihad could be managed, and that alliances in South Asia were still predictable.

What we are witnessing is not a border skirmish but the unravelling of an entire regional order.

The Front Line: TTP and Pakistan’s Demand

At the heart of Pakistan’s anger lies the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group that has carried out deadly attacks inside Pakistani territory. Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of offering the group safe havens across the Durand Line and of refusing to act decisively against them. Pakistani army chief General Asim Munir has publicly described the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan and recurring cross-border attacks as the main irritants in bilateral relations. Pakistan’s defence minister has gone further, suggesting that Pakistan could launch cross-border operations if Kabul continues to “harbour terrorists.”

In fact, Pakistan has carried out strikes inside Afghanistan in the past, and that is what Islamabad did once again last week as well. Pakistan’s strikes, although not officially confirmed by Islamabad, led the Afghanistan regime to launch a counterattack on Pakistan on the night of the 12th of October. Pakistan later confirmed that at least 23 soldiers were killed in the overnight attack. It also claimed to have killed at least 200 Taliban fighters while capturing several security posts. This is the deadliest cross-fighting between both countries in the recent past.

For Pakistan, Afghanistan and the TTP are not merely a security concern; they are also an ideological betrayal. Islamabad had expected that the Taliban government in Kabul would curb the TTP once it gained power. Instead, the Taliban have treated their Pakistani counterparts as fellow “mujahideen,” refusing to suppress them outright. This, however, is denied by the Kabul government. But what is apparent is what was once seen as Pakistan’s strategic victory - having a friendly government in Kabul - has turned into a costly miscalculation, with prospects of it getting worse only increasing with every border clash. The result is a crisis of trust that risks escalating into open warfare along one of the world’s most volatile borders.

Kabul’s Gambit: India, Legitimacy, and Strategic Hedging

Compounding Pakistan’s frustration is the Taliban regime’s growing engagement with India. Over the past year, Taliban officials have met Indian envoys on multiple occasions, including a recent visit to New Delhi by Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. India, for its part, has described Afghanistan as a “significant regional partner” and is quietly exploring avenues for trade and reconstruction that bypass Pakistan altogether, including via Iran’s Chabahar Port. It has already announced to change the status of its “Technical Mission” in Afghanistan to a proper embassy.

For Kabul, the logic is straightforward. Recognition from the West remains elusive, and economic isolation is crippling. Only Russia has extended formal recognition to the Taliban regime. By courting India - a regional power with money, influence, and global reach - the Taliban hope to gain both legitimacy and leverage. Yet, for Islamabad, this represents a geopolitical reversal. Afghanistan, once viewed as a buffer state within Pakistan’s strategic depth doctrine, now risks aligning with Pakistan’s arch rival.

The Taliban’s outreach to India underscores not only their assertion of sovereignty but also their willingness to play regional powers against each other. In this, they have learned from Pakistan’s own playbook. This situation has led Pakistan to more broadly embrace the Trump administration, inviting it to play a bigger role in the region. Islamabad’s offer to the US to build a seaport in Pasni, Balochistan, is a key indicator in this context of shifting geopolitical sands.

Washington’s Shadow: Bagram, Trump, and the Question of Return

Thus, adding another layer to this shifting landscape is Washington’s renewed interest in Afghanistan. President Donald Trump’s demand that the US must get the Bagram Air Base - a move the Taliban swiftly rejected - has revived memories of America’s longest war. The Taliban’s defiance, couched in the language of sovereignty and non-interference, was unsurprising. But Pakistan, too, cannot ignore the implications.

A revived US presence in Afghanistan would once again place Islamabad under pressure to pick sides between Washington and Beijing and potentially draw it into another cycle of proxy competition. For now, however, Islamabad sees the US as a key ally against Afghanistan, enhancing its confidence to increasingly adopt an aggressive military approach towards Kabul.

This is in the larger context of Pakistan’s own improved relations with the US. Washington has expressed interest in Pakistan’s rare-earth reserves and hinted at logistical cooperation, including potential access to seaports near the China-run port of Gwadar. Seen together, these moves signal an emerging triangular tension: the US probing for influence, the Afghan Taliban asserting autonomy and sovereignty, and Pakistan caught between opportunity and risk. The border war, then, becomes more than a local conflict; rather, it becomes an instrument through which global and regional powers test each other’s limits.

The Calculus of Regions: Russia and China Should Watch

For Moscow, this turmoil is far from peripheral. The Afghan frontier remains a critical fault line that can shape the security of Central Asia and the future of Eurasian integration. Renewed instability risks spilling into the “Stans,” where Russia maintains security commitments through the CSTO. Moreover, Pakistan’s internal and external security crises directly affect China’s core interests, particularly those tied to the multi-billion-dollar China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). If TTP violence escalates, Chinese investments - and by extension, Russian connectivity plans in Eurasia - could face setbacks.

More broadly, India’s engagement with the Taliban, Washington’s push for Bagram, and Pakistan’s rapidly shifting regional position together mark the return of Cold War-style competition in South Asia. The region could once again become an arena where US, Chinese, Indian, and Russian interests could collide. As any observer of Eurasian politics would understand, borders are never just lines on a map; rather, they are statements of history, identity, and influence. The renewed turbulence along the Durand Line, therefore, is not just a South Asian story. It is part of a larger geopolitical reordering that could redefine the balance of power from the Persian Gulf to the Himalayas - and from Beijing to Moscow.

Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/10/13/between-the-lines-of-conflict-pakistan-afghanistan-the-geopolitics-of-shifting-sands/