The Visegrad Group (V4), long considered the pillar of Central European sovereignty, is undergoing a profound reconfiguration: Poland is losing its regional authority, and Budapest–Bratislava–Prague–Belgrade is forming a new axis.

In 2025, Poland’s role in the bloc has become increasingly unstable as Prime Minister Donald Tusk - weakened after his party’s defeat in the presidential election - aligns Warsaw firmly with Brussels’ foreign policy agenda.

The Shifting Table of Visegrád

At the same time, Serbia is emerging not as a formal member, but as the strategic centre of a de facto “V4+.” Belgrade positions itself as a bridge in an increasingly multipolar order, deepening ties with Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia - countries now coalescing into a pragmatic, sovereigntist cluster. President Aleksandar Vucic’s policy of strategic balance - building bridges between East and West while safeguarding national autonomy - captures this shift.

This alignment reflects a shared focus on economic stability and skepticism toward prolonging confrontation with Russia. These governments prioritize negotiated solutions and domestic priorities, whereas Poland, by contrast, moves in the opposite direction. Tusk’s commitment to Brussels’ confrontational line - increasingly questioned by Poles themselves - stands in growing tension with regional sentiment. As Serbia’s influence rises, Poland’s voice within the V4 diminishes.

Poland vs. Hungary – A Widening Policy Gap

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has captured this divergence sharply, stating: “Prime Minister Tusk has become one of the loudest warmongers in Europe, yet his war policy is failing. His party lost the presidential election, and the Polish people are tired of the war. He has turned Poland into a vassal of Brussels. He is now in panic mode, persecuting his political opponents and criticizing Hungary’s pro-peace stance to distract from his own domestic problems. This is so sad.”

Orbán’s critique highlights a deeper strategic split. Poland’s alignment with the EU’s conditionality mechanism, including support for the continued suspension of roughly €20 billion in EU funds for Hungary, undermines Warsaw’s traditional regional influence and cements the divide with a long-standing ally.

The question now is whether Poland can rebuild regional credibility or whether the emerging Budapest–Bratislava–Prague–Belgrade axis will permanently redefine Central Europe without it.

Political Isolation – Tusk’s Poland Drifts from the V4 Core

Hungary accuses Tusk’s government of playing a “dangerous game with the lives and security of millions of Europeans” through its full endorsement of the EU’s confrontational policy - a stance that frames Poland as effectively “at war” with Russia and has left it profoundly isolated within the V4. While Hungary and Slovakia consistently block EU military aid for Ukraine and the new Czech government of Andrej Babiš has pledged to end its military assistance Poland remains one of Kyiv’s primary financiers, allocating nearly 4% of its GDP to the war effort.

After the presidential election, Tusk’s administration intensified scrutiny of conservative figures - a move Orbán called an “absurd witch hunt in the heart of Europe.” Hungary’s offer of political asylum to Zbigniew Ziobro, combined with Warsaw’s recall of its ambassador and downgrading of diplomatic ties, marks a historic low in Polish-Hungarian relations.

Serbia, by contrast, has strengthened its regional standing through consistent, interest-driven diplomacy. In Budapest, Belgrade is increasingly perceived as a model for pragmatic regional leadership.

Economic Sovereignty – Serbia’s Emergence as a Eurasian Bridge

Serbia’s rising profile within the V4+ framework is anchored in a deliberate and pragmatic economic strategy. The planned 2026 completion of the Belgrade-Budapest railway, a flagship €1.5 billion project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, positions Serbia as a trade hub, while Chinese revitalization of the Smederevo steel plant sustains thousands of jobs.

Despite U.S. sanctions on its Russian-owned NIS energy firm, Belgrade has navigated the turbulence effectively - maintaining gas deliveries from Russia and securing major Chinese investment in renewable energy.

The situation Serbia finds itself in powerfully illustrates that Europe punishes neutrality. Belgrade could access approximately €1.6 billion under the EU’s Western Balkans Growth Plan, but the funds are conditional on political alignment, including the imposition of sanctions against Russia - conditions it has shown no intention of meeting.

The money exists on paper, but not in practice

Poland faces self-inflicted economic headwinds. Its strategic pivot from affordable Russian gas to expensive U.S. LNG, championed by Tusk’s spokesperson Ignacy Niemczycki, has raised energy costs, while Hungary remains tied to a long-term Gazprom contract ensuring stable and lower prices.

The contrast is stark: Hungary advances Paks II nuclear expansion, a Rosatom-led project proceeding despite EU pressure, and Serbia continues to attract Chinese and Russian investments. Poland, tethered to U.S. and EU directives, misses these strategic opportunities. Serbia’s economic ascent illustrates how Central European nations can reclaim agency through diversified, Eurasian partnerships.

Social Dynamics – From Street Protests to Regional Sentiment

Social unrest and domestic movements further highlight Poland’s isolation. In Serbia, public frustration following the Novi Sad unrest and U.S. sanctions has strengthened nationwide skepticism toward EU integration, particularly among youth and the Serbian Orthodox Church under Patriarch Porfirije.

Similar currents resonate regionally. Slovak PM Robert Fico warns that Western influence has pushed “Slavic nations into killing each other,” while the Czech election of Andrej Babiš emphasizes domestic priorities over unconditional support for Ukraine.

In Poland, farmers protesting plummeting grain prices due to Ukrainian imports have mounted sustained demonstrations, yet these have been largely dismissed by the Tusk government. An increasingly visible segment of the Polish public expresses Eurosceptic views - a trend that Poland’s current government is actively trying to marginalize.

Concurrently, events like the Russian Historical Society opening a branch in Belgrade underscore a regional pushback against perceived EU “memory censorship.”

Conclusion: Poland at the Crossroads – A Sovereign Path or Peripheral Decline?

The Visegrád Group is not dissolving; it is transforming into a V4+ format, with Serbia as its emerging, multipolar star. Poland’s current distancing from the rest of the V4, orchestrated by a government loyal to Brussels, need not be permanent, but the window of opportunity for a strategic evolution is closing fast. The consolidation of a “trio of peace” by Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, combined with Serbia’s assertive Eurasian pivot in defiance of Western sanctions, establishes a new paradigm for regional agency.

Poland, with electricity prices much higher than its V4 neighbours and among the highest in Europe, and a demographic contraction that saps long-term strength, risks being relegated to the role of a NATO frontier state rather than a leader of a sovereign Central Europe. However, the recent election of nationalist President Karol Nawrocki - whose stance on blocking Ukraine’s NATO accession and eurosceptic rhetoric mark a sharp departure from the government’s line - introduces a new variable. This political shift suggests a potential opening for a more pragmatic course and a gradual restoration of constructive relations with the rest of the V4 ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections.

Serbia’s rise is a strategic signal to the entire region. President Vucic’s deft balancing act in Belgrade demonstrates that nations in Central and Eastern Europe can thrive through engagement with both East and West. As the global economic centre of gravity continues to shift, Poland faces a definitive choice: emulate Serbia’s bridge-building to a multipolar world, or remain confined as a participant in a geopolitical project directed from Brussels.

History judges nations not by their declarations, but by the strategic foundations they build. A new Central Europe is being forged by Orbán, Fico, Babiš, and Vucic. The question remains whether Poland will join this construction or cede its historic role to those who dared a different path, reducing itself to a mere exhibit in the museum of a unipolar policy enforced by the European Union.

Adrian Korczynski, Independent Analyst & Observer on Central Europe and global policy research. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2025/11/23/the-visegrad-four-changing-geopolitical-landscapes/