On January 19, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced snap elections for the Lower House of the Diet on February 8. The PM hopes to secure more seats for her coalition and consolidate a solid majority in the House.

In Japan, the Lower House, where the elections will be held, has more power than the Upper House, making this event extremely significant. As Takaichi herself has stated, the stakes in this election are her future as Prime Minister; she wants to gauge the public’s confidence in her leadership of Japan. The decision to hold the elections comes amid Sanae Takaichi’s high approval rating: in December 2025, it (based on surveys from eight organizations) ranged from 67% to 75.5%, while her disapproval rating was quite low, averaging no higher than 20%.

According to Professor Tamura Kotaro, Takaichi aims to follow Shinzo Abe’s example: she gains popularity through hawkish rhetoric, leading her party to victory in the elections, after which the PM adopts a more moderate stance, attempting to balance multiple interests. Tamura Kotaro suggests that this is precisely Takaichi’s calculation: after a successful election, she will compromise with domestic opponents and attempt to reconcile with other countries, particularly China (although a quick resolution to the crisis with the latter, in our view, is unlikely, given the developments in foreign policy and the actions of the Japanese PM).

Either way, in this article, we will assess the country’s political forces’ readiness for the elections and speculate on whether Sanae Takaichi’s gamble will pay off.

The Largest Coalition Aims to Expand

Sanae Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Renewal Party) are in a coalition that is the largest political force in both Diet Houses. However, the coalition’s position is tenuous: it lacks a majority in the Upper House by five seats and has only a one-seat majority in the Lower House.

The LDP’s minimum plan would be to gain a few more seats (around 10-30) in coalition with the Ishin no Kai for a more stable majority; the maximum plan (specifically for the LDP) would be to secure 34 seats, in which case a coalition with the Ishin no Kai would be unnecessary.

A rather challenging scenario would be for the LDP-Ishin coalition to win 77 seats. This would allow the parties to take two-thirds of the seats in the lower house and create the opportunity for constitutional amendments, which is so desired by the Japanese right. This, however, would also require the support of right-wing parties in the Upper House, but even with their support, a two-thirds majority would be unlikely. Furthermore, while it appears that the Japanese public actively supports militarization, it’s unclear what the silent majority truly thinks. It’s entirely possible that the amendments won’t receive majority support in the referendum.

In any case, a supermajority in the Lower House would be extremely advantageous for the LDP and Ishin no Kai. However, why did we call this scenario challenging? First of all, unlike Takaichi herself, her party’s approval rating is extremely low, ranging from 20 to 30%. It’s quite possible that the LDP will be able to maintain or even increase its number of seats solely on the authority of its leader, but gaining a supermajority is out of question.

Furthermore, some experts, such as Professor Jeffrey Kingston, note that the LDP’s previous coalition with Komeito was extremely effective in the elections. Established by the Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist religious movement, the Komeito was extremely effective in mobilizing voters for the LDP. Following the coalition’s collapse, Takaichi’s party faces a significant loss of votes, as the Osaka-based Ishin no Kai is unlikely to secure a similar level of support.

While we largely agree with this position, the author’s research has shown that the LDP-Komeito alliance in its final years should not be overestimated, as discussed in more detail in the next section. A more serious problem is that, judging by the latest statements at the time we write this article, the LDP and Ishin no Kai will have very limited coordination during the elections.

In any case, a scenario in which the coalition wins additional seats is entirely possible. After all, the opposition has only three weeks to prepare for the elections, which is incredibly short, especially given the sudden nature of the event. It’s possible that the LDP will benefit more from the snap elections than Ishin no Kai. For the latter, this will be a test of its electorate to see whether it supports the new quasi-alliance between its party and the LDP, with which it will effectively be competing in the elections.

Centrist Reform Alliance: New Coalition Prepares for Elections

On January 15, almost immediately after news of a possible snap election emerged, Komeito and the largest opposition Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) agreed to merge to form a new party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA). This party currently holds 172 seats in the Lower House (versus 233 for the LDP-Isin) and 63 in the Upper House (versus 120), making it a serious force in the upcoming elections.

Ideologically, Komeito is closer to the CDP than to the LDP, and, moreover, the Soka Gakkai and Komeito have maintained ties with representatives from this party since the 2000s. At that time and till 2016, the Democratic Party existed. The CDP emerged four years after the demise of the Democratic Party as the result of numerous mergers and splits between political groups. But the two parties share many politicians. For example, from 2007 to 2009, the leader of the Democratic Party was Ichiro Ozawa, a current CDP lawmaker. In 2010, representatives of Komeito negotiated cooperation with him (at the direction of Soka Gakkai leader Daisaku Ikeda). Since then, the parties discussed the possibility of Komeito withdrawing its support from the LDP.

Therefore, it would be hasty to describe the CRA as a spontaneous alliance formed solely for the sake of elections. Cooperation between the two parties was long viewed by representatives of both parties as a contingency plan should Komeito split with the LDP. And there were reasons to be concerned, as relations between the parties were unstable. While they had been held together by mutual compromises during Shinzo Abe’s tenure, after him, they began to deteriorate, leading to a split.

It’s also interesting that Komeito’s electorate isn’t blindly obedient Soka Gakkai cultists who vote whatever they’re told. They pay attention to what Komeito does and respond to its actions with their votes. Therefore, perhaps after abandoning cooperation with the LDP, Komeito’s pacifist electorate will vote more actively for their party.

Nevertheless, at this stage, the electorate doesn’t believe in the CRA’s success. According to an Asahi Shimbun’s poll, almost half of respondents (41%) don’t expect the new party to succeed, and when asked more specifically whether the CRA can compete with the Takaichi government, an overwhelming majority (66%) said “no.” Calling the party “Centrist” (likely to appeal to Japan’s significantly right-leaning electorate; the CDP is associated with the left, while Komeito is associated with the center-left) apparently didn’t help much. The CRA also has no time to shape its image.

Moreover, like the LDP-Isin, the new alliance will have a difficult time cooperating in electoral districts. Although, unlike the LDP-Isin, the alliance has a strategy (the CDP does not nominate candidates in districts with incumbent Komeito deputies, but does nominate candidates in most other districts; the two parties would combine proportional representation candidates under a unified list), due to the lack of practice in working together, the elections may not go well for the CRA.

The author of this article does not believe the CRA will be able to win a majority in the Diet. However, they may well be able to disrupt the LDP-Isin’s plans by drawing votes away from them.

Preliminary Forecasts

Among other opposition players, the Democratic Party For the People, which represents an alternative to the two largest party alliances and has consistently maintained this position, and Sanseito, which has gained popularity amid the country’s rightward shift but risks being lost in Takaichi’s shadow, could play a role. However, the main battle will be between the center-right LDP-Isin coalition and the (left)-center CRA.

Both groups are operating within new alliances, which could create difficulties. Overall, however, the LDP-Isin has the advantage: their leader enjoys widespread support, the surprise effect of the elections is on their side, and the ideas promoted by these parties are currently held in high esteem by the public. However, the opposition is also a force to be reckoned with (and that at least attempts to work together). The LDP-Isin coalition will likely retain its majority in the Lower House, but the opposition’s actions could impact how secure this majority will be.

Daniil Romanenko, a Japanologist researcher from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Courtesy

https://journal-neo.su/2026/01/22/snap-elections-in-japan-will-sanae-takaichi-win-her-gamble/